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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORKS IN 
 
THE STATE OF FLORIDA: 
 
A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS APPROACH 
 
by 
 
Patrick Michael Bell 
 
Florida International University, 2012 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Meredith Newman, Major Professor 
 
How do local homeland security organizations respond to catastrophic events 
such as hurricanes and acts of terrorism?  Among the most important aspects of this 
response are these organizations ability to adapt to the uncertain nature of these “focusing 
events” (Birkland 1997).  They are often behind the curve, seeing response as a linear 
process when in fact it is a complex, multifaceted process that requires understanding the 
interactions between the fiscal pressures facing local governments, the institutional 
pressures of working within a new regulatory framework and the political pressures of 
bringing together different levels of government with different perspectives and agendas.  
This dissertation has focused on tracing the factors affecting the individuals and 
institutions planning, preparing, responding and recovering from natural and man-made 
disasters. Using social network analysis, my study analyzes the interactions between the 
individuals and institutions that respond to these “focusing events.” In practice, it is the 
vii 
 
combination of budgetary, institutional, and political pressures or constraints interacting 
with each other which resembles a Complex Adaptive System (CAS).  
To investigate this system, my study evaluates the evolution of two separate sets 
of organizations composed of first responders (Fire Chiefs, Emergency Management 
Coordinators) and community volunteers organized in the state of Florida over the last 
fifteen years. Using a social network analysis approach, my dissertation analyzes the 
interactions between Citizen Corps Councils (CCCs) and Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) in the state of Florida from 1996- 2011. It is the pattern of 
interconnections that occur over time that are the focus of this study. 
The social network analysis revealed an increase in the amount and density of 
connections between these organizations over the last fifteen years. The analysis also 
exposed the underlying patterns in these connections; that as the networks became more 
complex they also became more decentralized though not in any uniform manner. The 
present study brings to light a story of how communities have adapted to the ever 
changing circumstances that are sine qua non of natural and man-made disasters.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORKS IN THE  
 
STATE OF FLORIDA: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS APPROACH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On the morning of September 11th, thousands of fire fighters, police, federal 
agents and medical personnel responded to a plane hitting one of the towers of the World 
Trade Center. Fire fighters put on their gear and rushed to the scene, police cornered off 
the affected streets, federal agents began to investigate, and medical personnel set up 
triage facilities. Each group reacted to the disaster using their own standard operating 
procedures. As the morning progressed, it became apparent that all of their procedures 
and protocols were inadequate to deal with the crisis at hand.  
 Among the most important impediments facing these officials in their response 
was the inability to communicate with each other because the various first responders 
(fire, police, medical) all had different radio systems and operating frequencies (9/11 
Commission Report). The inability to communicate led to a lack of coordination as 
dozens of fire companies (so-called ladders), police precincts, and hospital districts 
prepared for a massive rescue effort that quickly became a massive recovery effort. The 
length and depth of the crisis was not readily apparent initially as the entirety of lower 
Manhattan was closed to vehicular traffic.  
 Media accounts centered on the enormity of the event and news anchors spoke in 
hushed tones as the number of casualties increased. Senior governmental officials stated 
that “no one expected this to happen” (Brush, 2002). Various factors interacted with each 
other to create a unique series of events; a plane striking a building that was designed to 
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withstand the impact of a plane; a building’s steel girders designed to withstand high 
temperatures for short but not long periods of time, and the voluminous amounts of 
smoke choking the stairwells designed to provide an escape to those trapped in the 
buildings. As firefighters rushed into the towers and police controlled the massing 
crowds, the unthinkable finally happened; the towers fell.  
 Fire fighters, police, and medical personnel each planned and conducted their 
responses and operations separately from each other. Each of these groups followed 
standard operating procedures, developed over many years of practice, not taking into 
account the possibility of a missing factor or “variable”(the towers falling) as they were 
unable to “connect the dots” (9/11 Commission Report and Zakaria, 2011). 
The response to 9/11 is not unique; there is in fact a pattern of institutional 
responses that have taken a similar path. Other recent events like the 2004/ 2005 
hurricane season and the Gulf Oil Spill (2010) revealed that local governments and their 
various agencies were overwhelmed when confronted with either of two types of events; 
(1) low-probability/ high impact events such as a act of terrorism or an offshore oil spill, 
and (2) high impact/ higher probability events such as a category five hurricane (Comfort 
et. al, 2010, Eisenger 2006,  Scavo et. al, 2006, Waugh 2004, Birkland, 1997).    
 Both types of events galvanize public attention and serve to “focus” the attention 
of both the public and governmental officials on rescue and recovery operations. These 
responses often do not deal with the underlying causes that led to the event. In essence, 
both the public and governmental officials are consistently responding to the latest 
“focal” event. They are behind the curve with regard to planning, preparing, responding, 
and recovering; thus leaving themselves vulnerable to low probability/ high impact 
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events such as the towers falling (9/11), levees breaking (Hurricane Katrina) and safety 
systems failing on a deep water drilling platform (Gulf Oil Spill). While, at all levels of 
emergency management, some homeland security officials were behind the curve in 
making critical decisions, others, at the same time, were able to prevent significant loss of 
life and damage to property. To understand these differences, a shift in how we look at 
emergency management as an institutional system is necessary. Until now, theory saw 
emergency management as a linear process focusing on planning, preparing, responding, 
and recovering from natural and man-made disasters. But these processes (in practice) are 
dynamic and multifaceted. Furthermore, these processes take place within an institutional 
setting (or system) that also adapts its strategies to a constantly changing environment 
reflecting a denoted Complex Adaptive System (CAS). 
General Statement of the Research Problem 
My dissertation follows the development of local homeland security organizations 
in the state of Florida since 2001. These organizations, also in charge of emergency 
management, are seen as complex adaptive systems (CAS) as defined by Johnson (2007) 
and applied to emergency management by Kapuchu (2010). My dissertation describes the 
manner in which these organizations and the individuals that coordinate their actions 
have adapted to three types of constraints: (1) budgetary, (2) institutional and (3) 
political. While these constraints existed before, they recently have been modified to deal 
with ‘focal events’ such 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. In adapting to these constraints, 
these organizations and the individuals that coordinate their actions have developed novel 
methods of achieving their missions.   
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 To demonstrate agency adaptation in a quantitative manner, my dissertation charts 
the development of two sets of interconnected organizations, Citizen Corps Councils and 
Community Emergency Response Teams, from 2002 to 2011. To explain the adaptation 
in a qualitative manner, interviews were conducted with local emergency management 
officials in South Florida, to show how local first responders such as fire chiefs, have 
changed their management of natural or man-made disasters. Florida was chosen due to 
its experience with natural disasters and it reputation as a leader in the area of emergency 
preparedness and response.  
The management of natural and man-made disasters used to be the responsibility 
of localities, leading to a variety of “policies and practices” adopted by the various levels 
of government. These focusing events like 9/11 and the 2004/2005 hurricane season 
revealed a serious lack of coordination and communication among the various agencies 
involved in preparing, planning, responding, and recovering from a homeland security 
incident (Kettl, 2003).  
 Research investigating the response to 9/11, revealed the need for a new type of 
coordination among public administrators at all levels (Comfort et. al. 2010, Kapucu et. 
al, 2009, Kettl, 2003, MacManus and Caruson, 2004). The initial development of a 
national emergency plan (the National Response Plan or NRP) organized the different 
levels of government (local, tribal, regional, and national) through a system based on 
interoperability, joint planning, and training. An example of this: the use of the NRP (that 
was implemented in 2004) occurred during the response to Hurricane Katrina. The 
response to Hurricane Katrina also exposed the weaknesses of the National Response 
Plan; specifically the lack of coordination and cooperation evident in the evacuation of 
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the City of New Orleans.  The National Response Plan was deemed “bureaucratic and 
internally repetitive [and] insufficiently national in its focus” and was replaced by the 
National Response Framework or NRF issued in January 2008 (NRF, FEMA, 2008, 2).   
 Specifically, the NRF is defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
or FEMA as:  
“A natural evolution of the national response architecture. Although the NRP was 
originally called a plan, it was actually a framework written to guide the integration of 
local, tribal, state, and federal response efforts. By adopting the term “framework” within 
the title, this document is now more accurately aligned with its intended purpose (Source: 
website: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/about_nrf.pdf) 
 
Among the key purposes of the NRF is to define the roles of individuals and 
organizations involved in responding to natural and man-made disasters. This was 
through detailing the “key principles of response doctrine” These principles include: 
(1) “Engaged Partnership” to ensure “no one is overwhelmed in a time of 
crisis” 
(2) “Tiered Response” to ensure that “incidents are managed at the lowest 
level possible”  
(3) “Scalable, Flexible and Adaptable Operational Capabilities” to ensure 
that response is  “able to meet requirements [as] incidents change in 
size, scope and complexity” 
(4) “Unity of Effort through Unity of Command” to ensure that all 
organizations involved have a “clear understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of each participating organization.” 
(5) “Readiness to act” to ensure that actions are “balanced with an 
understanding of risk”  (NRF brochure, FEMA, 2008, 4) 
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The focus of these principles lies in the proposition that individuals, governmental 
organizations of all levels, private sector organizations and non-governmental 
organizations all have a role to play in responding to natural and man-made disasters.  
To address the inadequacies revealed by Hurricane Katrina, the National 
Response Framework mandated three actions including  (1) increased use of training 
exercises in which all agencies (local, tribal, state, federal) involved in homeland security 
planning to participate, (2) adoption of a common radio frequency standard, the 800mhz 
radio frequency, and (3) adoption of standardized radio protocols by all officials (local, 
state or federal) involved in responding to a homeland security related incident.  
 The basis of both the NRP and NRF is the National Incident Management System 
or NIMS which serves as the blueprint for all preparation, planning, response, and 
recovery from man-made and natural disasters. As a result, local and state emergency 
response plans are required to “implement the NIMS” according to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (FEMA, 2006, 2).  The number and scope of these mandates 
have increased in the ensuing fiscal years. There are twenty-eight “metrics” by which 
local governments are judged in FY 2009, the latest year for which “implementation 
objectives” were issued (FEMA, 2009, 1). Among these objectives is the creation of 
training programs for first responders, objectives 9-15, ensuring all “Federal 
Preparedness Awards” including those to local governments support NIMS compliance, 
objective 4, and “develop and/or promote intrastate and interagency mutual aid 
agreements”, objective 8 (FEMA, 2009, 1). 
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Various factors affect the implementation of the National Incident Management 
System. Two of the most important factors include: (1) the congressional appropriations 
process, and (2) the likelihood of a possible threat. For example, the original funding 
formula adopted by the Department of Homeland Security allocated seven times more 
funding per capita to Wyoming than to New York City (Scalet, 2006). The current 
funding formula mandates that a majority of an area’s funding be based on the threat 
assessment provided by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS website).  
 Concurrently, federal funding for local homeland security related projects have 
remained flat or decreased. Specifically, all funding provided from the Department of 
Homeland Security have amounted to ten percent less of all DHS funding in any fiscal 
year since 2003 (DHS Budget in Brief, FY 2004-2011). In order to receive funding, 
localities have to be rated NIMS compliant by the Department of Homeland Security. 
The fundamental issue confronting local homeland security decision makers is that they 
must devote time and staff to a resource intensive bureaucratic process.  Despite the 
increased workload, staffing levels in most jurisdictions have remained the same, thus 
leading officials to “wear multiple hats” in terms of their roles in complying with NIMS 
protocols. In spite of the federal mandate and the emphasis on training and equipment, 
some necessary tools have only been partially implemented.  
What the National Response Plan and the National Response Framework have in 
common is that they both form part of a larger pattern; they were largely “responses” to 
“focal events.” Each time a “focal event” occurred, the plan was revised to include new 
policies and procedures yet they did not address the underlying issue; that governmental 
responses are reactive and not proactive. The plans continually fail to address the missing 
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variable and are not connecting the dots. The plans are behind the curve in viewing the 
stages of emergency management as a linear process (as mandated by NIMS i.e. 
planning, preparation, response and recovery) when in fact they are a nonlinear process in 
which planning, preparing, responding and recovering occur in an iterative fashion that is 
reciprocally causal in nature.   
Statement of Purpose  
My study focuses on the response of local homeland security officials in dealing 
with the inadequate implementation of NIMS standards. It is hypothesized that local 
homeland security officials developed compensatory strategies through the creation and 
use of formal and quasi-formal networks. It is important to note here that a number of 
these changes, such as training, funding and mutual aid agreements were mandated by 
National Incident Management System. Others, such as the development of organizations 
such as a Community Emergency Response Team were not mandated. Furthermore, the 
most important factor in the development of Community Emergency Response Teams is 
that of citizen interest since these organizations are staffed, except for their coordinator, 
entirely by volunteers. Therefore, evaluating the number and density of network 
connections between these organizations will reflect the complexity of the network thus 
outlining a mixture or blend of mandated and improvised institutional change after the 
implementation of NIMS compliance objectives. My dissertation evaluates how local 
homeland security organizations, which while operating with the constraints of their 
institutions, have had to adapt to the new requirements.  
The evolution of Broward county homeland security organizations (BSO) 
provided one example; specifically, that the BSO has initiated a program entitled 
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“Automatic Aid” in which local first responders are dispatched to incidents based on 
geographic proximity, rather than jurisdictional boundaries (Interview with Broward 
County first responder (3C)). To gauge institutional change, the relationship between 
these organizations was evaluated via Social Network Analysis (SNA) using the 
following indicators: 1) the number of organizations existing within these networks (the 
mutual aid agreements between jurisdictions in Broward and Dade County) and 2) the 
density of connections between these networks at the local level (communications 
between various first responders, i.e., fire chiefs or police chiefs within and between 
Dade and Broward Counties).  
The number of organizations working in tandem to respond to natural and man-
made disasters has increased significantly during the years of 2002 to 2011. In particular, 
the organizations that increased the most were the Community Emergency Response 
Teams or (CERTs) and (CCCs) or Citizen Corps Councils. Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) are groups of volunteer neighborhood point-persons that 
communicate with first responders in the event of a natural or man-made disaster and are 
trained and overseen by local first responders. Citizen Corps Councils are umbrella 
organizations consisting of public, private, and non-profit organizations involved in 
preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters. In 2005, there were five 
CERTs and no CCCs in Broward County. By 2011, the number of organizations had 
grown to one County CCC, (Broward County), one Municipal CCC (Miramar) and 
eighteen Community Emergency Response Teams. 
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Research Questions and Methodology 
The research question this dissertation explores is how local homeland security 
organizations and their officials have adapted to the budgetary, political, and institutional 
constraints in the last decade.  To answer this question, a mixed approach employing both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques was used. To evaluate the interaction of the 
existing homeland security organizations in the state of Florida, an analysis regarding the 
number and density of connections among these networks was conducted using Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). Data for evaluating these networks were gathered through 
“dash-boards” covering the years 2001- 2011. These data are readily available on the 
internet on websites like www.citizencorpscouncil.gov and the Florida CERT association 
www.floridacertassociation.net. To obtain a more detailed picture of the institutional 
adaptation processes, additional data were collected through a series of interviews of 
local homeland officials. The interviews consisted of open-ended questions designed to 
evaluate the extent of changes that have occurred in these networks since 2001.   
According to Kapuchu and co-authors (2009), emergency management resembles 
a complex adaptive system (CAS) in which the organizations interact in a reciprocally 
causal manner that is characterized by the “interdependence” of local homeland security 
organizations, the individual who manages them, and the changes through the adaptation 
to budgetary, institutional, and political constraints. For example, the basis of the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the Incident Command System (ICS).  
The ICS was developed by a task force of local, state and federal agencies in California 
after a series of deadly wildfires in the early 1970’s which were caused by a severe 
drought worsened by increasing urbanization. The two factors (wildfires and 
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urbanization) interact, and neither factor is the “clear driver” causing a change in the 
others signifying “interdependence”. While there are several forms of interdependence, 
this study makes use of two main types: (1) political interdependence and (2) spatial 
interdependence. Political interdependence is defined as “the interdependence and inter-
connectedness of political processes in different jurisdictions” (Hay 2010, 6-7) like CCCs 
and CERTs in the State of Florida. Spatial interdependence is defined as “the 
interdependence of spatial scales” (Hay 2010, 6-7), meaning different levels of 
government, like local first responders and elected local officials. 
Hypotheses 
In my study, it is hypothesized that after the implementation of NIMS policies and 
procedures, local homeland security officials have increased their connections the 
organizations that make up local homeland security policy  
Thus it is hypothesized that: 
 As local homeland security networks become more complex over time (2002 to 
2011), they become more decentralized. Decentralization is operationally defined by an 
increase in the number and density of connections between organizations that make up 
local homeland security policy during the last ten years. This is measured by the presence 
of a common jurisdictional boundary that is determined by the areas served by two sets of 
local homeland security organizations; i.e. CCCs and CERTs.  
Operationalizing Variables 
 Following the work of Agranoff (2007), for the purpose of this study, a formal 
network is operationally defined as a chartered network which exists as a “formally 
established organized entity” such as a 501(c) 3 non-profit organization, and was 
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established by the action of a legislative body, or an executive order of a governor, or 
through registration with the Secretary of State; CERTs and CCCs are examples of 
formal networks. 
Social Network Analysis is a procedure that quantitatively evaluates and 
graphically displays the number and density of connections among “actors” in these 
organizations (homeland security officials or organizations).  Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) has been used to evaluate other aspects of homeland security policy including 
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (Kapuchu, 2009). Using SNA 
reveals how the evolution of these networks took place. Analyzing the number and 
density of connections between these networks will help to depict local governments’ 
responses to administrative mandates following focal events such as 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina.  
Significance of the Study 
The present dissertation focuses on the adaptation of local homeland security 
organizations and their officials to institutional mandates and constraints using a 
longitudinal approach and applying a complex adaptive system model. While there is a 
growing body of  research in public administration concerning the institutional adaptation 
of homeland security organizations, relatively few other researchers (Bellavita, 2006; 
Currao, 2009, Kapuchu, 2009) have seen these institutional adaptation processes as a 
complex adaptive system and applied CAS methodology to local homeland security 
organizations. Furthermore, most of their research followed on a cross-sectional 
approach. 
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Using a longitudinal approach and viewing these institutional adaptation 
processes as a non-linear development, my study employs social network analysis to 
depict the “pattern” or variety of interactions among CCCs and CERTs in the state of 
Florida. In addition, the outcome of social network analyses was enhanced by a series of 
interviews of local homeland security officials outlining the breadth and depth of the 
adaptations within the framework of institutional, budgetary, and political constraints. 
The results of the present research describe how both the number and density of 
connections between CCCs and CERTs in the state of Florida have increased over the last 
decade. My analysis also revealed how the decision making processes of local homeland 
security officials became more decentralized while adapting to institutional, budgetary, 
and political constraints. 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter one, gives an outline of the study, its purpose and significance.  
Chapter two presents the theoretical underpinnings of the study through a synthesis of the 
literature on emergency management, social network analysis (SNA) and complexity 
theory. In this chapter, key concepts of emergency management such as “focal events,” 
key concepts of SNA such as “centrality,” and key concepts from complexity theory such 
as “interdependence” and their importance to analyzing local homeland security networks 
are expounded upon in depth. 
Chapter three details the methodology used to collect, analyze, and evaluate the 
hypotheses under study. In particular, chapter three will include a description of the 
techniques used to collect and analyze the data collected as well as any software packages 
utilized in the study.  
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Chapter four presents the results of the SNA of the CCCs and CERTs in the state of 
Florida. Included in this section, will be several tables and maps that are produced using a 
SNA software program entitled UCINET 6 which is the primary program for this type of 
analysis.  
Chapter five presents a discussion of the results of chapter four in relation to the 
hypothesis presented in chapter one.  
Chapter six presents the contents of a series of interviews that are woven into a narrative 
providing context for chapters four and five. 
Chapter seven presents a conclusion to the study in terms of its hypothesis. It also 
discusses the limitations of the study and provides guidance regarding questions raised by 
the study for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION AMONG LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY  
 
OFFICIALS: THE CASE OF SOUTH FLORIDA 
 
Before 9/11, in the state of Florida, various local governmental organizations 
were in charge of emergency management. Each organization had their own: functions, 
standard operating procedures, communication protocols and operated in an independent 
fashion.  After 9/11, new institutional mandates were issued by the federal government to 
address the lack of cooperation and coordination displayed during the response to the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A new institutional framework was 
put in place to increase cooperation and coordination, both within and between levels of 
government in charge of emergency management.  
A senior Broward County Fire official made the following statement concerning 
this framework.  
Well, I think the training requirements may have changed, made us change. We’ve- 
everybody has to be trained in NIMS to their level- required level and we have to manage 
that now. It’s a – one of those unfunded mandates (Senior Broward Fire Official (9I))  
 
As a result of this increased cooperation and communication, local homeland 
security officials reported a growing interdependence:  
The State of Florida – I’m not sure if every state does it, but the State of Florida after 
September 11th then coordinated a joint effort between the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, that’s kind of the lead agency, FDLE, and the local sheriff’s offices.  Every 
county in Florida, all 67, have a sheriff’s office, created Regional Domestic Security Task 
Forces.  There are seven in the state. They created them along the lines of our Division of 
Emergency Management Zones, so the seven regions have already existed. (Senior 
Miami Dade Fire Official (4D)) 
 
There is evidence from the existing literature (Macmanus and Caruson 2006) that 
the growing interdependence among local organizations is the result of mandates from 
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federal and state governments dealing with homeland security-related issues. The 
National Incident Management System is one example of these mandates. In response to 
NIMS mandates and focal events like 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, Florida’s local 
homeland security organizations formed a group or network of organizations, CCCs and 
CERTs and increased their reliance on Mutual Aid Agreements to adapt to budgetary 
constraints. To provide evidence of local government's response to administrative 
mandates such as NIMS, the evolution and interaction of existing homeland security 
networks in the state of Florida, were analyzed via “Social Network Analysis” (SNA). 
Specifically, the number and density of connections among two sets of organizations, 
CCCs and CERTs, were evaluated.  
 In particular, interactions between CCCs and CERTs were operationalized as the 
degree of connectedness or "centrality" (Kapucu et al. 2009, Knoke and Yang 2008). The 
more connections an organization has, the more “central” it is to the network. Each CCC 
and CERT is part of a larger network in which each organization serves as an “actor” or 
connection point in the network.1  
 Analyzing local homeland security networks in the state of Florida via SNA 
necessitates understanding SNA’s theoretical bases. “[S]ocial networks” are defined as 
“finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations set on them (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994, 20).” “Actors” can be people in a group, departments within an organization, 
or even nations in the world geopolitical system (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 17, Knoke 
                                                            
1 The concept of “actors” is central to social network analysis and forms the basis for the analysis 
that will follow in this dissertation. A more detailed discussion of this concept will be made in the 
next chapter. Additional information on social network analysis can be found at the following 
website: http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/ 
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and Yang, 2008, 6-7). These organizations can be connected by a variety of factors they 
have in common. Such factors are denoted “relational ties” where a “relational tie” is 
defined as a “linkage between a pair of actors” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 18, Knoke 
and Yang, 2008, 6-7).   
There are two basic types of relations between actors, (1) directed in which “one 
actor initiates and one actor receives” or (2) non-directed in which each actor initiates and 
receives. My dissertation concerns the directed relational ties between CCCs and CERTs 
in the last ten years. It is important to note here that the tie itself is not an attribute of the 
actors individually, but a separate property of the relation itself. In other words, the 
relation/tie itself has a value that is separate and distinct from the other actors and “exists 
only as long as the association occurs” (Knoke and Yang, 2008, 7).  
In terms of homeland local security policy, a fire chief has a specific relational tie 
with another fire chief which only exists within their professional capacity. There may be 
other informal relations such as those of a friendship that impact the professional relation, 
but from an analytical standpoint, these are separate relations. The distinction between 
types of relations i.e. professional or friendship is important, because the individuals that 
make up these local first responder organizations often must “wear multiple hats.” For 
example, nearly all of the CCCs and CERTs in the state of Florida are coordinated by a 
first responder (fire or police official) or a local emergency manager. The importance of 
these organizations lies in the fact that they have come to represent a significant resource 
for local first responders in adapting to the institutional constraints placed on them by 
other higher levels of government. 
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 But how can we analyze the various types of relations represented in a network in 
a clear, concise and efficient manner? One way is to develop a “structure” for analyzing 
the “network data” collected. It is important to emphasize that “network data” is in many 
respects the same as the “conventional data” collected from surveys or focus groups. It 
can be quantified and arranged in arrays that depict how these data relate to each other. 
This can be done by creating a matrix that defines the relations between the actors in a 
network where the presence of a relation is denoted by a 1 and the absence of a relation is 
denoted with a 0 2 (Hanneman and Riddle, 2008, 69-70). 
Local Homeland Security Networks in Analytical Perspective: Developing a 
Typology for Homeland Security Related Network 
 
Now that we have defined a network in general and its components in detail, it is 
appropriate to move on to define networks within the area of homeland security policy. 
Robert Agranoff, in his book Managing Within Networks, provides a basic typology for 
what he terms “Public Management Networks (PMNs). Using the definition first 
proffered by O’Toole, Agranoff states that PMNs are “structures of interdependence 
involving multiple organizations… where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate 
of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement” (O’Toole quoted in Agranoff, 
2007, 7).  
A key distinction between PMNs and the more traditional public bureaucracies is 
the locus of authority for management. In more traditional public bureaucracies, authority 
is vested legally in the positions of officials in the hierarchy of their organization. In 
                                                            
2 An “incidence or affiliation matrix” is a special type of square array that is used to record and 
display data about the relationships between two types of organizations (Hanneman and Riddle, 
2008, 69-70). 
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PMNs, management is more collaborative and based more on consensus building 
(Agranoff, 2007, 8-9). The concept of collaborative management is crucial to the 
understanding of how a network functions since the “structure” (i.e., relationships 
between organizations and even between individuals engaged in their operation) are the 
locus of network activity. Overall, the management in networks is different than in most 
public bureaucracies because the authority among network actors is interdependent. 
Specifically, it is a network’s ability and agility to respond to novel threats arising from 
natural and man-made disasters that determines the success of the network’s responses. 
For example, reliance on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact in the wake 
of Hurricane Katrina is an example of the use of a PMN in practice (Kapuchu, 2009).  
Proceeding from this general definition of networks as interdependent structures, 
PMNs can be characterized by two general types 1) chartered and 2) non-chartered.  
Chartered networks are “formally established as organized entities” such as 501(c) 3 non-
profit organizations, actions of a legislative body or an executive order of a governor, or 
through registration with the Secretary of State. Non-chartered networks have no 
“formal-legal status”; they make an impact through various activities, including meetings 
and other organized activities (Agranoff, 2007, 7). An example of a chartered network is 
CERTs, which includes a volunteering neighborhood point-person who communicates 
with first responders in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.  
Both of these types of networks share common characteristics, such as regular 
formal meetings and identifiable participants, partners and governance structures through 
which their members participate including websites, newsletters and holding of offices. 
In order to better understand how local homeland security officials and their institutions 
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have adapted to changing administrative mandates, it is important to evaluate both types 
of chartered and non-chartered networks- for two reasons: (1) As stated by Agranoff 
(2007), many institutional adaptations of the last five years have occurred outside the 
mandates of chartered organizations, like the Automatic Aid Agreements between 
different municipalities,  and  (2) these adaptations have taken the form of dynamic 
instead of static interactions between chartered and non-chartered networks.  
PMNs: Where form follows function 
In practice, PMNs span the boundaries of public, private and non-profit organizations 
which make up both chartered and non-chartered networks. Public Management 
Networks also serve different functions, just as the organization they are composed of 
serve different functions. This dissertation concentrates on four different types of 
networks: (1) Informational Networks, (2) Developmental Networks, (3) Outreach 
Networks, and (4) Action Networks. 
(1) Informational networks can be seen as clearinghouses for information. 
Action based on the exchange is left to the discretion of the 
participants. In homeland security policy, informational networks exist 
among various first responders and elected officials.  
(2) Developmental networks combine “information and technical 
exchange…with education and member service” (Agranoff, 2007, 10). 
These networks function as a conduit for capacity building among 
member organizations. In homeland security policy, these networks 
serve to assist member organizations by providing not only 
information but expertise that assists members in implementing best 
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practices. The development of regional or statewide security task 
forces, such as the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces employed 
in the State of Florida, is an example of a developmental network.   
(3) Outreach networks integrate information exchange and technologies 
that “lead to new programming avenues” (Agranoff, 2007, 10). In 
homeland security policy, these networks not only serve to exchange 
information and expertise, but also to assist in implementing new 
programs.  One example would be the Council of Governments 
operating throughout the United States of which the South Florida 
Regional Planning council is a member.   
(4) Action networks are those in which member organizations “formally 
adopt collaborative courses of action” (Agranoff, 2007, 10) in addition 
to exchanging information, expertise and technology. These networks 
deliver services that are agreed upon by the network itself. The 
collection of CCCs and CERTs that have formed in the last decade in 
the state of Florida are an example of an action network. Not only do 
they provide information, expertise and technology, when mobilized 
for a man-made or natural disaster, they deliver services to their 
neighborhood. As described by a Broward County official:  
“We’re pulling in volunteers… the key part of its they’re out in the community in their 
neighborhoods where the people know them, so if they come up to their neighbors and they, you 
know, see that they’re flooded or they’re lightly trapped or they need first aid, it’s not like a 
stranger, you know, coming up to them.” (Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)).
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Figure 1: Typology of Local Homeland Security Public 
Management Networks based on the schema of Agranoff (2007) 
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 “Flying below the radar”: The importance of analyzing local PMNs 
 Given that PMNs exist at all levels of government, why study PMNs at the local 
level? The main reason is that on this level “most of the real work is done”. For example, 
first responders respond to either a natural disaster such as a hurricane or a man-made 
disaster such as a terrorist attack at the local level. Furthermore, while responses to 
disasters involve multiple actors at all levels (local, state, federal, and even international), 
these responses must be coordinated for delivery at the local level. For example, though 
the response to Hurricane Katrina involved dozens of organizations, these responses 
needed to be coordinated with local officials, who had more first- hand experience with 
the conditions on the ground (Agranoff, 2007,11, Kapucu et al, et. 2009, Lagadec, 2007). 
Thus interactions between the levels of government represent an important variable in 
analyzing how emergency managers respond to natural and man-made disasters. 
 One example of this coordination is the use of Emergency Management 
Assistance Compacts (EMACs) in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Specifically, EMAC’s are defined as “mutual aid agreement[s] and partnership[s] 
between states that allow states to assist one another in the event of a natural or man- 
made disaster” (Kapucu et al. 2009, 297). EMAC’s are seen as a result of “dissatisfaction 
with emergency response operations following Hurricane Andrew” (Kapucu et al. 2009, 
297). 
 Finally, one must differentiate between the various types of interactions. 
Specifically, there are three types of interactions among governments: (1) partnerships, 
(2) collaborations and (3) networks. The factors differentiating these interactions are the 
level of formality, range of issues and duration of the relationships created by these 
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interactions. Partnerships exist at one end of this continuum where public or private 
organizations informally “agree together to achieve a desired goal” that is limited in 
scope and have no enduring relationship outside of this goal. Networks are more formal 
in terms of both the length of the relationship and the range of issues they deal with over 
time. Specifically, networks can have a range of relationships that run along the 
continuum from those that are loosely affiliated to those that are heavily interdependent 
and create new autonomous organizations as a result of their interactions (Kapucu, 2009, 
298). This study focuses on the interactions between the CCCs and CERTs in the state of 
Florida. 
 Using social network analysis (SNA), my study will examine the extent of 
interdependence present among local homeland security organizations. Specifically, my 
study will analyze the adaptations that occurred in response to new forms of 
interdependence that have presented themselves in the last decade.  
Interdependence: a key construct in understanding institutional adaptation 
 But what does interdependence look like in practice? Interdependence is defined 
in this study as “a relationship between two or (invariably) more factors, processes, or 
variables characterized by reciprocal causation or, perhaps better, mutual conditioning” 
(Hay, 2010, 6). There are two specific conditions which characterize interdependent 
interactions: (1) a change in one of the “factors, processes, or variables” must lead to a 
change in the “other factors, processes or variables” under study and (2) there is no “clear 
driver (or determinant) of the change in the others” (Hay, 2010, 6). Thus these 
interactions can be seen not as dependent on any one factor, process or variable, but on 
many factors taken together and thus interdependent.  
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 For example, the Incident Command System (ICS) was a response of a task force 
of local, state, and federal agencies to a series of wildfires in California in the early 
seventies. After the 9/11 attacks, the ICS became the basis of the National Incident 
Management System. While the emergency management policy existed for decades prior 
to the implementation of NIMS, it needed a “focusing event” to provide the impetus for 
centralization. 
Distinguishing among forms of interdependence 
 While there are several forms of interdependence, this study makes use of three 
types based on the work of Moran (Moran in Hay, et. al., 2010); (1) institutional, (2) 
spatial interdependence, and (3) policy interdependence. In the world of emergency 
management, mutual aid agreements are examples of institutional interdependence, 
coordination of different levels of government are an example of spatial interdependence, 
and interdepartmental cooperation is an example of policy interdependence.  
For the purpose of my study, institutional (also called political) interdependence is 
operationalized as the jurisdictions of municipalities as characterized by United States 
postal service zip-codes. Spatial interdependence on local homeland security 
organizations will be analyzed through the interaction of Citizen Corps Councils (CCCs) 
and Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in the state of Florida. In 
addition, policy interdependence or interdepartmental cooperation is evidenced by the 
interviews of local homeland security officials which also provide the context within 
which the interactions among local homeland security organizations can be evaluated. 
Using these three types of interdependence as a theoretical framework, this study 
analyzes the “inter-connectedness” of the different jurisdictions that make up the 
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Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF) of the state of Florida. The RDSTF is 
an organization that involves municipalities, counties, and the State Department of 
Emergency Management. These jurisdictions will be evaluated in terms of the 
interconnectedness of local homeland security organizations that have developed along 
side local first responder organizations such as Police and Fire Departments.  
Specifically, these jurisdictions will be evaluated in terms of the interconnectedness of 
two organizations, Citizen Corps Councils (CCCs) and Community Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs). In practice, CCCs serve as umbrella organizations that bring together 
public, private and non-profit sector organizations in preparing, responding and 
recovering from natural or man made disasters.  Community Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) are groups of volunteer neighborhood point-persons that communicate with first 
responders in the event of a natural or man-made disaster and are trained and overseen by 
local first responders.  
Of particular interest in this analysis is the presence of new forms of institutional, 
spatial, and policy interdependence that characterize the “catastrophic risks” associated 
with man-made and natural disasters (Hay, 2010, 38). For example, the RDSTF deals 
with natural and man-made disasters and uses so called CCCs and CERTs as clearing 
houses of information for “actionable knowledge” (Agranoff, 2007, 10). 
Measuring Interdependence: Developing operational measures 
How can you measure interdependence in a network? Specifically, how can this 
measure be operationalized?  My study will use “Centrality” as a measure of the amount 
of decentralization present in the network as hypothesized in the previous chapter. 
Specifically, this study will measure the amount of centrality present in the CCCs and 
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CERTs in the state of Florida. Figure two displays the seven Regional Domestic Security 
Task Forces that make up the State of Florida System under the State of Florida Division 
of Emergency Management within which the CCCs and CERTs operate. 
Figure 2:  Statewide view of the seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces 
(RDSTFs). 
 
Source: 2010 Annual Report of the Florida Division of Emergency Management and 
found at http://www.floridadisaster.org/documents/2010ARfinal.pdf 
 
In practice, Centrality will be measured in terms of the interconnectedness of 
CCCs and CERTs that operate in tandem with the RDSTFs that make up the Florida 
Division of Emergency Management system. The concept of centrality will be further 
elaborated on in the next chapter which deals with the methodology of this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
My dissertation has developed a theoretical framework to analyze the institutional 
adaptation of local homeland security organizations in Florida over the last ten years.  A 
core construct in the framework is that these local homeland security organizations form 
a network that is a complex adaptive system (CAS).  Complex adaptive systems are those 
that have the following:  (1) the existence of many active parts that (2) respond to 
feedback and are (3) able to adapt their strategies to respond to previous experience. They 
(4) seem to be “alive” as they evolve in a non-linear manner without a single identifiable 
controller. These complex adaptive systems display an “emergent” behavior or a behavior 
that occurs as the result of the interactions of the parts together as opposed to 
individually. As denoted in Ryan (2006), “…Emergence is not a property of a system at 
any point in time, it is a relationship between system properties at two different moments 
in time” (Ryan 2006, 11). An example of emergence is the response of the individuals 
forming new CCCs and CERTs in the aftermath of the Macondo Well explosion in April 
2010. A more detailed explanation is given in chapter four about this focal event.  
In order to better evaluate the evolution of homeland security organizations 
during the last decade in response to mandatory changes, a case study approach was used. 
It is hypothesized that as both the number and density of connections between CCCs and 
CERTs have increased; the networks have become more decentralized. But why has this 
case study approach been chosen? It has been chosen on the basis of the “focusing 
events” that have occurred in the last decade.  A “focusing event” is defined as a “rare, 
harmful, sudden event that becomes known to the public and policy elites virtually 
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simultaneously” (Birkland, 1997, 7). The importance of the focusing event lies in its 
ability to affect the agenda-setting process of public policy making. A focusing event’s 
power comes in part from its rarity and its unusual and sudden nature. To evaluate the 
effect of focusing events through the presence of adaptation to institutional constraints, 
the following methodology was applied to the network of CCCs and CERTs in the state 
of Florida over the time period 2002 – 2011.  
The first section evaluates the number and density of connections among 
organizations through the use of sociograms or “directed-relations graphs” of the network 
structure created with the NETdraw program within the UCINET 6 software package. 
The size of the nodes or “actors” is determined by the number of connections. The second 
section describes the network interconnectedness using the measures of Degree and 
Betweeness Centrality calculated using the UCINET 6 software package.  
In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework was developed to analyze the 
institutional adaptation of local homeland security organizations in South Florida over the 
last ten years. A core construct in this theoretical framework is that emergency 
management resembles a complex adaptive system (CAS) in which the organizations 
interact in a reciprocally causal manner that is characterized by interdependence. But how 
is this interdependence measured? My study will measure interdependence by using the 
ideas denoted in Michael Moran’s article “Policy Making in an Interdependent world” 
(2010).  
 My study; however, will go beyond Moran’s conceptual framework concerning 
interdependence in complex adaptive systems, but it will apply his methods by using the 
techniques of social network analysis (SNA). By using SNA, I will analyze the “patterns” 
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of interconnectedness found in these two sets of organizations: Citizen Corps Councils 
and Citizen Emergency Response Teams. 
Among the most important “patterns” existing among local homeland security 
networks are that of interdependence. The ubiquity of mutual aid agreements among local 
first responder organizations in the State of Florida is an example of this pattern of 
interdependence. Mutual Aid Agreements are defined by FEMA as: 
“Agreements [that exist] between agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions that provide a 
mechanism to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, 
materials, and other associated services. (FEMA Website)”  
 
Analyzing the level and density of interdependent relationships is the key to 
understanding these organizations’ adaptations to institutional constraints. 
Defining the “patterns” that bind  
 
In order to understand the various types of relations that exist among local 
homeland security networks, it is necessary to further define the “patterns” that link them 
together. In general, there are four patterns of interaction: dyadic, triadic, subgroup and 
group. Dyads form the basis for most social network analysis. Dyadic relationships 
consist of ties between two actors. Specifically, a dyad “consists of a pair of actors and 
the ‘possible’ ties between them.” “Dyadic analyses” concern the characteristics of 
relationships between two actors (a dyad) which may be either two-way (“reciprocated”) 
or one way (“not reciprocated”). Dyadic analyses also concern whether these patterns of 
interaction occur by themselves or in multiples (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 18). For 
example, a dyadic two-way relationship exists between a Mayor and the Fire chief or 
Police Chief of a municipality such as Miami or Fort Lauderdale.  
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 Likewise, triadic relationships consist of ties between three actors. Triadic 
relationships are more complex than dyadic relationships; there is also the possibility of a 
more complex “structure” among the actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 19).  Within 
the structure, there are now three possible interactions. For example, a triadic relationship 
exists between the Fire Chiefs of the Metro Dade, Broward County Sheriff’s Office and 
the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Coordinators in Miami Dade, Broward and Palm 
Beach Counties.  
 The third type of a relationship is a “sub group.” This relationship is defined as 
“any subset of actors, and all the ties among them”. In terms of homeland security, this 
sub group could include all dyadic or triadic relationships. An example would be all the 
relationships between fire chiefs and mayors in Miami Dade, Broward and Palm Beach 
counties or the relationship between all fire chiefs, police chiefs and mayors in these 
three counties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 19, Knoke, and Yang, 2008, 13). 
 The fourth type is concerned with the behavior of entire “groups” defined as the 
“collection of all actors on which ties are to be measured” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 
19). However, for measurement to take place, the “group” must be defined more 
specifically. Inclusion in the group must be made on one of three bases; conceptual, 
theoretical, or empirical (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 19-23). In practice, my dissertation 
treats the Citizen Corps Councils and Community Emergency Response Teams of the 
state of Florida as the group used for social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994, 19, Knoke, and Yang, 2008, 13). Conceptually, these organizations are responsible 
for implementing the plans created by governmental authorities and deal with focal 
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events. Theoretically and empirically, the state of Florida is the geographic boundary of 
the group.  
Measuring the “ties” that bind: Centrality and the Interconnectedness of Local 
Homeland Security Networks 
 
Now that we have described the types of ties and relations, one can now move on 
to specify measures by which local homeland security networks will be evaluated. This 
study will concentrate on Centrality which is a measure of the prominence of actors at 
“both, the individual and groups level” (Knoke and Yang, 2008, 62). There are two types 
of centrality used in this dissertation (1) degree centrality and (2) betweenness centrality.  
Degree Centrality: Connectedness & Interdependency 
Degree centrality measures “the extent to which an [actor] connects to all other 
[actors] in a social network” (Knoke and Yang, 2008, 63). For example, at the individual 
level of analysis, it measures the extent to which a local fire chief is connected to other 
first responders, other local fire chiefs, emergency managers, police chiefs, hospital 
officials, and local volunteers, etc. At the group level of analysis, degree centrality 
assesses to what extent a local organization such as a local fire department is connected 
to other first responder organizations, such as other local fire departments, emergency 
management organizations, police departments, hospitals and non-profit/voluntary 
organizations.   
These two measures of degree centrality, individual and group centrality, can be 
thought of as analogous to measures of central tendency (i.e., the mean) and dispersion    
(i.e., the standard deviation) in descriptive statistics (Knoke and Yang 2008, 64 – 65).  
Each of these measures has a range of values between 0 and 1, with 0 meaning no 
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connectivity to other actors and 1 meaning connectivity to all other actors in the network. 
These values can also be normed to account for the size of the network itself to allow for 
comparisons between networks (Knoke and Yang, 2008, 62 -63). 
When taken together, these measures assess the overall centralization of the group 
as a whole and are denoted in the term “network centralization index” (Hanneman, 2008, 
149).  Organizations that contain more horizontal than vertical connections are seen to be 
more flexible and adaptable in terms of their ability to respond to both natural and man-
made disasters. Measuring the amount of degree centrality is one method of assessing the 
“adaptability” of a network (Wise, 2006 and Wise and Nader 2006).  
Betweenness: Evaluating the influence of actors on information flow in local 
homeland security networks 
 
Betweenness centrality is a measure of how much an actor controls or “mediate[s] 
the relations” between other actors that are not directly connected. In other words, how 
many actors exist in the “direct path” between the two actors under study? As the number 
of actors “mediating the relations” increases, so does the Betweenness centrality. In this 
sense, Betweenness centrality is a measure of the flow of information between actors who 
are not directly connected. As the amount of Betweenness centrality increases, so does 
the concentration of information until all information must flow through a single actor in 
the network (Knoke and Yang, 2008, 67 – 68). 
In terms of homeland security policy, Betweenness centrality is an important 
indicator of the flow of information among actors or groups. It is defined as “a 
communication relation where actors could not form new lines, central actors could 
refuse to pass along messages.” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 189-190).  Prior to 9/11, 
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agencies such as the CIA and the FBI were statutorily barred from sharing information.  
One of the main conclusions of the 9/11 Commission Report was that intelligence from 
one agency was not being shared with other agencies, not allowing them to “connect the 
dots” concerning the plot to use airliners to attack the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon (9/11 Commission Report). Consequently, there were various institutional 
barriers present when sharing information regarding a possible terrorist threat. For 
example, a high degree of Betweenness centrality among the federal agencies prevented 
these “actors” from connecting the dots. Reducing the amount of Betweenness centrality 
has been a major aim of homeland security policy since the 9/11 attacks. Using 
Betweenness centrality in an analysis of the local homeland security networks in Florida 
will evaluate the impact of local efforts to respond to administrative mandates from the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (USDHS) and the Florida Department of 
Emergency Management.  
From ties to relations: Developing a schema for analyzing relations in a local 
homeland security network 
 
In order to put the various kinds of ties between dyads, triads, sub groups, and 
groups into a larger perspective, one must categorize similar ties together through a 
“relation”.  A relation is defined as “the collection of ties among members of a group of a 
specific kind” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, 12). In general, there are four types of “relations” 
being evaluated in this study:  
(1) Communication relations in which “linkages between actors are 
channels through which messages may be transmitted” (Knoke & 
Yang, 2008, 12). Specifically, my dissertation focuses on the exchange 
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of “actionable intelligence” or “actionable knowledge” between 
horizontal and vertical networks of emergency management personnel.  
(2) Instrumental relations where “actors contact one another in efforts to 
secure valuable goods, services, or information.”(Knoke &Yang, 
2008, 12) This dissertation focuses on personnel and resource 
connections between network actors, like a fire chief and other first 
responders.  
(3) Boundary penetration relations in which “ties consist of membership 
in two or more social formations which may have overlapping 
relations.” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, 12) This dissertation focuses on 
membership in formal organizations such as voluntary organizations 
(CERTs and CCCs) as vehicles for the exchange of information and 
assistance.  
(4) Authority/power relations, which consist of ties “usually occurring in 
formal hierarchical organizations” such as elected offices, and 
emergency management institutions (Knoke and Yang 2008, 12). 
These relations were used as a framework for analyzing the interconnections between the 
actors in the network of CCCs and CERTs in the state of Florida. 
Operationalization and Testing of Hypotheses 
For the purposes of this dissertation, local homeland security organizations are 
operationally defined as Citizen Corps Councils (CCCs) and Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) in the state of Florida. Both CERTS and CCCs are formal 
networks. Following the work of Agranoff (2007) and for the purpose of this study, a 
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formal network is operationally defined as a chartered network which is a “formally 
established organized entity” such as a 501(c) 3 non-profit organization, action of a 
legislative body, or an executive order of a governor, or through registration with the 
Secretary of State.   
Social Network Analysis was used to quantitatively evaluate and graphically 
display the number and density of connections among so-called “actors” (homeland 
security organizations). The purpose of using Social Network Analysis (SNA) in this 
dissertation is to reveal how the evolution of these networks took place.  The number and 
density of connections between these networks is an example of local government's 
response to administrative mandates to compensate for institutional constraints. In 
particular, it is the degree of connectedness or "centrality" (Kapucu et. al. 2009, Knoke 
and Yang 2008) that is an important variable in measuring these connections. The use of 
SNA serves to measure the level of connectedness or "centrality" in these networks as 
they respond to administrative requirements as a result of focal events such as 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina. 
To further test the above-mentioned hypothesis concerning the institutional 
adaptation of local homeland security networks in Florida, a series of nine interviews 
were conducted with the leadership of the regional domestic security task force for the 
state of Florida.  
Data collection 
Data were collected on the activities of the twenty-one (CCCs) and their affiliated 
organizations. I used data from the ninety- one Community Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) currently registered with the CCC website for the state of Florida (as of 
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10/31/2011).3 The CCCs’ and CERTs’ participation were measured with regard to 
mobilizations for actual disasters. 
Mobilizations are operationally defined as the activation of one or more CCCs 
and/or CERTs in response to a warning or disaster declaration of a natural or man-made 
disaster by at least one local government. Increased activity is reflected in denser 
connections among the CCC and the CERT organizations. The measure of activity serves 
as an operationalization of the “interconnectedness” of these organizations with more 
activity corresponding to greater interconnectedness and thus a “denser” network of 
connections. For example, an organization that has participated in three mobilizations is 
more active than one that has participated in a single mobilization. 
Data for mobilizations were acquired from publicly available websites such as 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CertIndex.do?reportsForState&cert=&state=FL and from 
the State level Citizen Corps Council for the state of Florida. Using the UCINET 6 
software package, an “incidence or affiliation matrix” was developed to record the 
presence of emergency management organizations, first responder organizations, and 
affiliate organizations such as CERTs’ responding to natural and man-made disasters. 
Examples of disaster response include mobilization of personnel in response to natural 
disasters such as hurricanes during the 2004-2005 hurricane season (DHSG, 2011, 38). 
An “incidence or affiliation matrix” is a special type of square array that is used to record 
and display data about the relationships between two types of organizations (Hanneman 
                                                            
3 The one exception is that of the Lee County CERT which was registered with the Florida State CERT 
association but not with the CCCs website.  
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and Riddle, 2008, 69-70). This type of matrix is commonly used in Social Network 
Analysis to evaluate the relations or ties between organizations.  
 If it is true that the complexity of homeland security networks is positively 
correlated with their decentralization, then the number of these organizations and the 
density of connections between them should increase. Thus creating incidence or 
affiliation matrices are a way of operationalizing and testing the hypothesis. Furthermore, 
by evaluating the nature and extent of these connections, this study is a first step in 
revealing the “agency and structure” of local homeland security networks in the state of 
Florida (Hanneman and Riddle, 2008, 69-70).   
Constructing the Network 
The sociograms produced in my dissertation were constructed by using a four step 
process. The first step included creating a database that contained a common reference 
point with which to compare all of the actors in the network. In my dissertation, zip codes 
were chosen because they are the primary method by which membership in a CCC or 
CERT is determined for the network in question. For example, when the Gulf Oil Spill 
occurred, thousands of citizens wanted to volunteer; they were assigned to the nearest 
CCC by their zip code. These data were obtained by viewing the “Areas served section” 
of the Town of Century CCC webpage found at 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/showCouncil.do?id=47762. Second, a matrix was created 
to display which organizations were connected to each other. This matrix contained a list 
of all the connections of the organizations in the network. In my dissertation, a 
connection was determined to exist if and only if two organizations served the same zip 
code. The third step included choosing a measure by which to evaluate the connections 
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present among the organizations in the network. The organization with the most 
connections is the most “central” actor or node in the network. This actor will have a 
greater “centrality” than the other actors. The fourth and final step involved using the 
matrices to produce directed relation graphs or sociograms. In my dissertation three 
matrices, for the years 2002, 2005, and 2011, were created. The larger the node, the more 
central it is to the network. 
An important note in terms of jurisdiction 
 In order to better understand this “agency and structure,” one must begin with an 
analysis of how CCCs and CERTs are organized jurisdictionally.  Citizen Corps Councils 
are organized to be run at the lowest governmental level possible. A map of the 
jurisdictional boundaries can be found page sixty- six. In the event of a natural or man-
made disaster, the CCC will serve as a clearinghouse for information and coordinate the 
actions of member organizations in responding to natural or man-made disaster in their 
jurisdiction. Additional CCCs may be chartered at anytime once they have met the 
criteria for the formation of a Citizen Corps Councils4.    
For the purposes of this study, a CCC and a CERT are considered to be connected 
if and only if they share one common jurisdictional boundary. Jurisdictions for CCCs  
and CERTs are determined by the United States Postal Service Zip Codes (USPS ZC) 
which they serve.   
                                                            
4 In addition to citizen interest, the main qualification for starting a council is that it be “sponsored or 
endorsed by an elected local government official or city or county administrator who has responsibility 
over the local government's operations.” (http://www.citizencorps.gov/about/faq.shtm#councilformed) on 
September 8, 2011. For more complete information on the guidelines for forming a CCC  a guide can be 
found at http://www.citizencorps.gov/downloads/pdf/councils/council.pdf 
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Thus if a CCCs’ or CERTs’ jurisdiction is countywide then it is connected to all 
other CERTs in that county. The only exception to this is the case in which a CCC has 
been created for a specific municipality. It is possible that a municipality will have a 
CERT created that is connected to other municipal CERTs but not to all of the CERTs in 
a county. The key to this “interconnectedness” lies in the common jurisdictional 
boundary, in this case the USPS ZC. 
Data for this study were generated from three sources: 1) Interviews of local 
homeland security officials such as first responders (fire and police officials), 2) Data 
gathered from government websites such as 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CertIndex.do?reportsForState&cert=&state=FL     and 
the Florida association of CERTs at www.floridacertassociation.net, 3) data from news 
stories from public newspapers such as the Miami Herald and news sources such as 
Associated Press and Reuters.  
The interviews were conducted with a series of senior homeland security decision 
makers including fire officials, police officials, former elected officials and state 
emergency management personnel. These interviews were conducted in the months from 
April to October 2010. These interviews were based on an elite interview style and were 
based on a series of open ended questions. The interviewees were selected both for their 
expertise and their experience with local homeland security policy. To protect their 
confidentiality the following interview coding schema was used:  
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Table 1: Interview Coding Schema  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data were used to construct three matrices that summarize the connections 
between the organizations. Connections are evaluated on the basis of the existence of 
common jurisdictional boundaries since they are the basis of mutual aid agreements. 
These matrices represent "one mode networks" since they evaluate connections based on 
the existence of "one mode" or piece of information; the existence of overlapping 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
These data measured both the number of organizations and the density of 
connections between them. These data formed the basis of a “network census” that 
measures connections between local Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) 
and the Citizen Corp Councils (CCCs). Currently, there are fifty-six statewide CCCs and 
there are 1,170 county, local, tribal CCCs nationwide. There are 1,995 CERTs 
nationwide.  The present study focuses only on (1) the twenty-one CCCs in the state of 
INTERVIEW NUMBER OFFICIAL’S TITLE 
1 Senior Miami Dade County 
Fire Official (1A) 
2 Senior Miami Dade County 
Fire Official (2B)  
3 Senior Broward County Fire 
Official (3C) 
4 Senior Miami Dade County 
Fire Official (4D)  
5 Senior Broward County Fire 
Official (5E) 
6 Senior Palm Beach County 
Official (6F) 
7 Senior State Official (7G) 
8 Senior Miami Dade County 
Police Official (8H) 
9 Senior Broward County Fire 
official (9I) 
42 
 
Florida with sixteen existing at the county level and five at the local level and (2) the 
ninety-one CERTs in the state of Florida (as of 10/31/2011). 
Each of the CCCs and CERTs has a coordinator, usually a first responder. In 
order for these organizations to work together, the coordinators have to communicate 
with each other when a natural or man-made disaster occurs. In order to know which 
coordinators to contact, they must ascertain which CCCs and CERTs are closest to the 
disaster and that is determined by their jurisdictional boundaries. Knowing the 
jurisdictional boundaries of each CCC and CERT is crucial to determining how these 
organizations interact with each other. It is reflected in the Citizen Corps website, for 
each CCC and CERT can be found at the above listed website.  
Using these data, a database was created which contains all of the CCCs and 
CERTs and their jurisdictional boundaries. Three matrices were created to reflect which 
organizations had overlapping jurisdictional boundaries and would be contacted in the 
event of a focal event. These matrices contain a series of 1s and 0s which denote the 
presence (1) or the absence (0) of a common jurisdictional boundary. These matrices are 
then analyzed to determine which CCCs and CERTs have the most overlapping 
jurisdictions and are more “central” to the network than those organizations which have 
overlapping jurisdictional boundaries.  
To evaluate the growth and change of these networks over time, a network census 
was conducted for the past fifteen fiscal years using the UCINET 6 Software package 
developed by Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman. The NETDRAW program was used to 
produce the diagrams which are derived from these matrices and appear in chapter four. 
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The matrices of 2002 and 2005 can be found in Appendix A and the matrix of 2011 can 
be found in Supplementary File 1.  
Specifically, a series of sociograms or directed relation graphs were created for 
the network of CCCs and CERTs in 2002, 2005 and 2011. Then, a series of Centrality 
measures were calculated for the network of CCCs and CERTs in 2002, 2005 and 2011. 
Specifically, Degree and Betweenness centrality measures were calculated for each 
network in 2002, 2005 and 2011. These measures are reported as tables found in chapter 
four. The tables containing values reported for each of the CCCs and CERTs can be 
found in appendix B. An analysis of each of the network in terms of the number of 
organizations and the density of connections was undertaken. Finally, a comparison of 
these two networks was completed to determine the changes that have occurred over the 
intervening ten years. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ANALYSIS OF LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORKS IN FLORIDA 
 
Mainly, the focal events of September 11th 2001 and Hurricane Katrina have had 
a major impact on how local emergency managers plan, prepare, respond and recover 
from natural disasters. Especially the case in Florida since it has experienced seven 
hurricanes from 2004-2005 and the Gulf Oil spill in 2010. The chapter reports the results 
of the social network analysis to trace the evolution of CCCs and CERTS in the state of 
Florida during the last decade. Although the network of CCCs and CERTs was 
established in 2002, there were eighteen CERTs that existed at that time with the earliest 
CERT being founded in 1995, in Hillsborough County.  CCCs were selected as the unit 
of analysis as they are the umbrella organization through which the public, private, and 
non- profit sector organizations interconnect on a routine basis as well as in the event of 
the mobilization for natural or man-made disasters.  
Evolution of Local Homeland Security Networks in the state of Florida 
In 2002, the year the network was established following the attacks of 9/11, there 
were only two CCCs, the statewide and the Palm Beach County Citizen Corps Council. 
However, there were eighteen CERTs with fifteen of them being connected to the 
statewide CCC while the Palm Beach County CCC was connected to the three 
Community Emergency Response Teams.  The sociogram (Figure 3) reveals this 
structure organizationally, though not geographically. It clarifies that, in 2002, the state-
wide CCC and to a much smaller degree, the Palm Beach County CCC is the most central 
actors to the operation of the network.
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Figure 3: Florida CCCs and CERTs in 2002  
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By the time of the next focal event, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there was 
substantial growth in the network of CCCs and CERTs (Figure 4). The number of actors 
in the network expanded to contain forty-eight organizations composed of seven CCCs 
and forty-one Community Emergency Response Teams. There are seven “components” 
or sub-graphs to this network that include a total of one hundred and twelve connections.5 
These components are connected according to their respective county CCC or if non-
existent, the statewide Citizen Corps Council.  These seven components of the graph 
include the statewide CCC and the CCCs of Hernando, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm 
Beach, Pasco, and Sarasota counties.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 A “component” or sub-graph is a part of a network in which the actors are all connected to each other 
through some other actor of the graph but not to the larger graph itself. In this way components are 
“disconnected” from other parts of the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 109-110). 
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Figure 4: Florida CCCs and CERTS in 2005 
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Figure 5 along with Table 2 show that the statewide CCC is the most central actor 
in the 2011 network.  It reveals the relative number of connections, both to and from the 
statewide CCC and the CERTs. This proportion of connection is denoted normed degree 
centrality and it allows comparisons longitudinally as it is a standardized measure (like a 
z-score).  Over the last decade, the most central actor was the statewide CCC; however, 
its relative importance decreased over time by two thirds, from a normed degree 
centrality of 94.73 (2002) to 36.36 (2011). 
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Figure 5: Florida CCCs and CERTs in 2011 (by Freeman Degree Centrality) 
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Table 2: Top five Florida CCCs and CERTs by their Normed Degree Centrality in 
2002, 2005, 2011 
 
ORGANIZATION 
 
YEAR 2002 
 
YEAR 2005 
 
YEAR 2011 
Statewide 94.73 61.70 36.36 
Palm Beach County Citizen Corps 
Council 
15.78 10.63 4.54 
Delray Beach CERT 
 
10.52 
 
10.63 1.81 
River Walk 10.52 
 
4.25 1.81 
West Palm Beach CERT 10.52 4.25 1.81 
Palm Beach County CERT N/A 10.63 4.54 
Fort Lauderdale CERT 5.26 8.51 14.54 
Hillsborough County Citizen Corps 
Council 
N/A 6.38 4.54 
Metro Orlando Hispanic CERT N/A 
 
N/A 7.27 
 
Broward County CCC N/A N/A 15.45 
 
Lee County CERT N/A N/A 9.09 
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The next largest component in 2002 was the Palm Beach County CCC which has 
a normed degree centrality of 10.6.  It also decreased its centrality by one-third from 
2002 to 2005 and two-thirds by 2011 from 15.78 to 4.54. In 2005, the Palm Beach 
County CERT has an identical normed degree centrality score to that of its CCC which 
means that they are equally connected to all parts of its network; not the case in all 
counties. The Fort Lauderdale CERT, which had a normed degree centrality score of 5.26 
in 2002, had no CCC at all. Unlike the other CERTs, its normed degree centrality 
increased by 161 % (8.51) from 2002 to 2005 and 276% (14.54) from 2005 to 2011.  The 
Fort Lauderdale CERT became more central to its network over the last decade. A 
complete list of all actors and their respective normed degree centrality scores can be 
found in Appendix B.  
In 2011, there were one hundred and twelve organizations composed of twenty-
one CCCs and ninety-one CERTs featured in figure 5. There are seventeen components 
which contain two hundred and fifty-seven connections. These components are also 
organized by their county CCC or the Statewide CCC. These components include the 
Statewide CCC, Broward County, Escambia County, Hernando County, Hillsborough 
County, Jackson County, Miami Dade County, Okaloosa County, Palm Beach County, 
Pasco County, Pinellas County, Polk County, and Sarasota County.  There are also a 
number of municipal CCCs including, the City of Pensacola CCC, the Miramar CCC, the 
Sanford CCC, The Town of Century CCC, and The City of Key West CCC. 
Figure 5 and table 2 display the results of the analysis for the network of CCCs 
and CERTs in 2011. The most central actor of the network continues to be the Statewide 
CCC; however, with a reduced normed degree centrality of 36.06. Furthermore, the 
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position of the top five actors has changed with the most recent creation of a Broward 
CCC that has a normed degree centrality of 15.31. The Fort Lauderdale CERT has a 
normed degree centrality of 14.41 and nearly doubled its importance since 2005. Overall, 
all CERTs (except for the Fort Lauderdale CERT and the newly established Metro 
Orlando Hispanic CERT) decreased with regard to normed degree centrality, meaning, 
they became more decentralized. 
Evaluating the Network as a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) 
What has happened to the networks in the intervening ten years? Notice that the 
number of organizations has expanded from twenty to one hundred and twelve, an 
increase of 560%. There are an increased number of CCCs as well as CERTs. The 
number of CCCs has grown from two to twenty-one, an increase of 1050%. The number 
of CERTs has increased from eighteen to ninety-one, an increase of 505%. 
While it is noteworthy that the order and relative centrality of actors has changed 
between 2002 and 2011; however, this does not tell us whether the entire network is more 
decentralized.  To assess decentralization, we need to analyze the summary measures of 
the network in terms of the connections of their actors in both 2002 and 2011. Tables 3 
and 4 present these results.  
When these measures for the network in 2002, 2005 and 2011 are compared, they 
show a significant amount of decentralization. The first measure is the Network 
Centralization Index, a measure of central tendency for the system as a whole. Over the 
last decade, network centralization has decreased from 92.98% in 2002 to 34.25% in 
2011. The second measure is the Blau Heterogeneity, which is a measure of variability.  
The decentralization is even more pronounced with Blau Heterogeneity decreasing from 
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20.41% in 2002 to 3.20% in 2011. When the measure of variability denoted normed 
(IQV) is used, the network is still more than six times as variable in 2002 (16.22%) as it 
is in 2011 (2.33%). 
Table 3: FLORIDA CCC and CERT overall degree centrality measures for 2002, 
2005, and 2011 
 
 2002 2005 2011  
Network 
Centralization 
92.98%  59.48% 34.25% 
Blau 
Heterogeneity 
20.41 % 9.02% 3.20%  
Normalized  
(IQV) 
16.22 % 7.09% 2.33% 
No. of 
Observations 
20 48 112 
 
Another way to measure decentralization is denoted Normed Mean Degree 
Centrality, which is a standardized mean of the network connections within the entire 
system.  Comparing the network of 2002, 2005 and 2011, found in Table 4 below, it is 
apparent that the network of 2011 is more decentralized than the network of 2002 and 
2005. The normed mean degree centrality in 2002 is 11.5. In 2005, it decreased to 4.699 
and in 2011 to 2.441, meaning the proportional share of these connections has decreased 
indicating a more decentralized network. In terms of CCCs and CERTS, this network 
decentralization indicates that fewer first responders of any specific organization are 
needed to cover a certain area. 
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Table 4: FLORIDA CCC and CERT overall normed mean degree centrality 
measures for 2002, 2005, and 2011 
 
 YEAR 
2002 
YEAR 
2005 
YEAR 
2011 
Overall Mean 
Normed  Degree 
Centrality 
11.05 4.69 2.39 
Number of 
Observations 
20 48 112 
 
 
Evaluating the Communication within the System: Measuring Information Flow 
 
Given that the network of CCCs and CERTs in Florida have become more 
decentralized between 2002, 2005 and 2011 in terms of their normed degree centrality, it 
is also important to evaluate the connections between individual actors by calculating 
each network’s Freeman Normed Betweeness Centrality and Network Centralization. 
Freeman Betweeness Centrality is a measure of information flow which after 
normalization allows longitudinal comparisons of the distance that information between 
individual CCCs and CERTs have to travel. Network Centralization is a measure for the 
entire system regarding information flow.  
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Table 5: Information Flow in overall Freeman Betweenness Centrality measures for 
Florida CCCs and CERTs 2002 - 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, when the network is compared for the years 2002, 2005 and 
2011, two trends were revealed. First, the information flow as measured by the Freeman 
Mean Normed Betweeness Centrality has significantly decreased which means that CCCs 
and CERTs are receiving critical information faster, despite the fact that there are five 
times as many actors in the network. Also, the overall Network Centralization has 
decreased significantly from 73.4 to 9.7 over the last decade.  Meaning that although the 
number of connections has increased, the time it takes for information to flow through the 
entire system has decreased. In terms of CCCs and CERTs, this increased number of 
organizations and connections mean that assistance is much closer than before. In the 
past, hurricane damage assessments were conducted by first responders directly.  
Hurricane damage assessments can now be communicated directly with an Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) by each CERT instead of first responders. This allows first 
responders to better prioritize available staff and resources.  
The analyses discussed above indicate that the network of CCCs and CERTs in 
Florida has become significantly more decentralized in 2011 than it was in 2002 as was 
hypothesized at the beginning of this dissertation. This is true despite the increased 
 2002 2005 2011 
Freeman Mean 
Betweenness Centrality  
3.991 .787 0.127 
Network Centralization 73.36 36.94 9.74 
Number of Observations 20 48 112 
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number of organizations and the increased number of connections between them. Thus as 
the network has become more complex over time, it has become more decentralized. 
Overall, less first responders are needed to cover a municipality as assistance is now 
around the corner and information flow has increased.  
Tracing the Development of Local Homeland Security Networks in Florida: 
Two Case Studies of Institutional Adaptation 
 
To illustrate these results, the institutional adaptation of CCCs and CERTs in 
recent emergency management history were analyzed. The first was a series of seven 
hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 that impacted the state of Florida. The second was the Gulf 
Oil Spill of 2010. 
Hurricane Charley made landfall on the Southwest Florida coast on August 13th, 
2004 initially impacting Charlotte County, Florida and then traversing across Central 
Florida including Orange, Osceola and Volusia Counties.  Hurricane Frances made 
landfall along the Treasure Coast and St. Lucie and Martin Counties on September 5th, 
2004 and crossed Central Florida exiting Florida in Pasco County and reentering Florida 
in the Northeastern part of the state known as the “Big Bend Region” that includes 
Region two (Bevens II National Hurricane Center, 2004, 1-2). Hurricane Ivan made 
landfall along the Alabama/Florida boarder on September 16th, 2004. It weakened but 
continued east and then south where it eventually made landfall again in Southern Florida 
traversing the Florida Peninsula and emerging in the south eastern Gulf of Mexico 
(Stewart NHC, 2004, 2-3). Hurricane Jeanne made landfall in approximately the same 
area as Hurricane Frances on September 25th, 2004. It then traversed westward across 
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Central Florida, exiting at Hernando County, approximately thirty nautical miles north of 
Tampa. (Cobb and Lawrence, NHC, 2005. 1-2) 
 In 2005, two hurricanes, Katrina and Wilma made landfall along the coast of 
Southeastern Florida while another one, Rita, turned into a hurricane while passing 
through the Florida Straits near Key West. Hurricane Katrina, one of the worst natural 
disasters in United States history, made landfall first along the Broward/Miami Dade 
County Border on August 25th, 2005 as a Category one hurricane. It traversed across the 
Southeastern portion of the Florida Peninsula exiting Monroe County near Cape Sable 
into the Gulf of Mexico. It then strengthened into a category five hurricane on the Saffir 
Simpson Hurricane Scale (SSHS), but weakened to a Category three before it made 
landfall and impacted much of the Gulf Coast of the United States including the states of 
Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Hurricane Wilma first made landfall 
in the Southwestern Coast of Florida in Collier County near Naples, Florida (Cape 
Romano) as a Category three hurricane on the SSHS on October 24th, 2005. It traversed 
across the Florida Peninsula in a northeastern direction exiting the state from Palm Beach 
County near the town of Jupiter, Florida. (Nabb, Rhome, Brown, NHC, 2005, 1-4 and 
Pasch, Blake, Cobb III, and Roberts 2006 1-2)  
During the eighteen month period that encompassed the 2004-2005 hurricane 
seasons (June 2004 – November 2005) a total of ten organizations, three CCCs and seven 
CERTs were formed along the paths of the hurricanes. Within one month of the landfall 
of the first hurricane (Charley), one CERT (Orange County, September 2004) and one 
CCC Hillsborough County, (August 2004) were formed. By January 2005, two more 
CERTs were formed, Gulfport (Pinellas) and Coral Springs (Broward County). By the 
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beginning of the 2005 hurricane season (June 2005), another six organizations, two CCCs 
and four CERTs were formed.  Overall, while no one hurricane can be seen as the sole 
factor affecting the creation of CCCs and CERTs, taken together these focal events are a 
significant contributing factor.  
The second case study concerns the gulf oil spill in April 2010 after the Macondo 
Well Platform located in the Gulf of Mexico exploded and sank (DHSG, 2011, 38). As a 
result of the disaster, there was an outpouring of support from the public which needed to 
be organized. To direct the thousands of volunteers that were coming, local emergency 
managers agreed to sponsor two Citizen Corps Councils, one in the Town of Century and 
One in the City of Pensacola. As in the other cases, volunteers were assigned to a Citizen 
Corps Council based on the Zip Code of their primary residence. For example, residents 
from the surrounding towns of Century (32535), MC David (32568) and Molino (32577) 
were a part of the Town of Century CCC. Furthermore, all of these organizations in 
Escambia County are administered by one Coordinator, DeAnna Polland-Stemock, who 
is also working for the Be Ready Alliance or (BRACE). BRACE is the “successor 
organization” created to assist families when the Escambia Long Term Recovery 
Committee was disbanded after the landfall of Hurricane Ivan in September 2004.6 
Figure 6 below is a map of the counties impacted by the Gulf Oil Spill.  
 
 
 
                                                            
6 http://www.bereadyalliance.org/what_is/ 
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Figure 6: Region One of the Florida CERT Association  
 
Source: http://www.floridacertassociation.net/area1.html 
 
The most compelling evidence for institutional adaptation of this network comes 
from the fact that all these additional CERTs and CCCs were formed after each focal 
event occurred. Stated another way, the focal events (the 2004- 2005 hurricane season 
and the Macondo Well Explosion) occurred directly before the formation of these 
organizations, thus increasing the likelihood that the more recent experience of man-
made and natural disasters had a direct impact on the network of CCCs and CERTs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION OF 
 
LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORKS 
 
The previous chapter detailed the ways in which two interconnected groups of 
local homeland security organizations in the state of Florida, the CCCs and the CERTs 
have adapted to changing conditions from January 2002 to October 2011. The results of 
this analysis revealed that the network of local homeland security organizations has 
become more complex and decentralized over time. These institutional adaptations did 
not occur in a vacuum. They are the product of the interactions not just of organizations 
but of the individuals who both coordinate and participate in preparing, planning, 
responding and recovering from natural and man-made disasters. It is important to note 
that analyzing the development of the two sets of organizations provides a vehicle for 
understanding the actions of these individuals as they do not act on their own but in the 
context of budgetary, institutional and political constraints.  
The implications of this development have important ramifications for 
understanding how these networks develop over time. In particular, this development is 
best described as a complex adaptive system which has four characteristics: 
(1) The individuals and the organizations that they represent interact with 
each other in a non-linear fashion. 
(2) The individuals and the organizations they represent respond to 
feedback from their environment such as the landfall of a hurricane or 
an oil spill. 
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(3) The individuals and the organizations they represent adjust their 
strategies for planning, preparing, responding and recovering from 
both man-made and natural disasters.  
(4) The actions of the individuals and the organizations they represent can 
not be linked in a linear fashion to any one specific causal mechanism 
or series of mechanisms.  
To investigate the factors underlying this institutional adaptation, this chapter will 
focus on three facets of these interactions.  
(1) Covariation: Do the interactions of the individuals and the 
organizations they coordinate vary in a directly or an inversely 
proportional manner over time? In other words, is the level of 
decentralization positively or negatively correlated with the size of the 
network over time?  
(2) Temporal precedence: Do these adaptations precede or follow the 
changes in their environment?  
(3) What plausible alternative explanations exist for the observed 
adaptations?  
Using these three facets, a better understanding of the factors affecting the development 
of local homeland security networks in the state of Florida can be made.   
 In answering these questions, this dissertation has used the complex adaptive 
system (CAS) model developed by Johnson (2010) and others (Bellavita, 2006; Currao, 
2009, Kapuchu, 2009; and Machal, 2011) as a theoretical framework from which to 
analyze the interactions present among two types of organizations (CCCs and CERTs). In 
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the model, it is important to note that the adaptation present in this network (and used in 
the analyses in the previous chapter) is the result of individual as well as collective 
action. It is not only the organizations but the individuals coordinating these actions that 
are the focus of this study.  In particular, it is the patterns of the interactions among 
CCCs and CERTs and the individuals that coordinate them that are the focus of this 
study.   
Analyzing the Patterns of Covariation: Types of Interactions among Local 
Homeland Security Networks in the State of Florida 
 
What is the pattern of interactions among CCCs and CERTs in the state of Florida 
over the time period 2002–2011? Specifically, is there a correlation between these 
interactions as they become more complex over time? As shown in Table 3 and Table 5 
of the previous chapter, there is an increased amount of decentralization present in the 
network during the last decade, the overall Freeman degree network centralization index 
decreased from 93% to 34% and overall Freeman betweenness centralization index 
decreased from 73% to 10%. Moreover, this trend is present for all the variability 
measures presented in Table 5.  
The results indicate that there is an inversely proportional relationship between 
network centralization and network size. As the network becomes larger, it becomes 
more decentralized. It can; therefore, be asserted that there is a positive correlation 
between network size and the amount of decentralization present in the network over 
time.  
Over time, there are not only more organizations but more connections between 
these organizations. For example, the network started with twenty organizations having 
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thirty- nine connections and grew to one hundred and twelve organizations having two 
hundred and fifty-seven connections. Given that there are more organizations the 
question then becomes when did these organizations form?  
Addressing Temporal Precedence in the Adaptation of Local Homeland Security 
Networks 
 
Given the presence of a positive correlation between network size and level of 
decentralization, a second important question comes to the surface: exactly when did this 
decentralization occur? The data of the Regional Domestic Security Task Force were 
analyzed in terms of their regional responses to two more recent disasters, the 2004-2005 
hurricane Seasons and the Gulf Oil Spill (2010). “Regional responses” are operationally 
defined as the month and year that each CCC and CERT within a certain area was 
created. The creation of these organizations reveals (1) how local homeland security 
organizations respond to feedback and (2) adjust their strategies in responding to their 
environments. Therefore, institutional changes (like the creation of additional regional 
CCCs and CERTs) after a disaster are very likely to be an institutional adaptation to a 
recent experienced need.  
It is also important to note here that the formation of new organizations is 
predicated on two important individual actions, citizen interest and the willingness of an 
elected or appointed official to sponsor a CCC or a CERT. The fact that these 
organizations were formed in the wake of a series of hurricanes and a man-made disaster 
is prima facie evidence of both citizen interest and the willingness of local officials to 
sponsor these organizations. For example during the 2004-2005 hurricane seasons, a total 
of six hurricanes made landfall in the state of Florida and one passed through the Florida 
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straights on its way to the Gulf of Mexico. All of these hurricanes caused significant 
damage in terms of property, and in some cases, caused great loss of life.  After these 
hurricanes, a total of ten new CCCs or CERTs were formed.  A second example concerns 
the Gulf Oil Spill where two CERTs and two CCCs were formed as the disaster evolved 
in Escambia County.  Furthermore, in 2010, two CERTs located in Hamilton County, 
Lafayette County and one CCC in located in Sumter County was established in Region 1 
(Northwest Florida).  
Accounting for Alternatives: Plausible Rival Explanations of the Formation of 
CCCs and CERTs in the State of Florida 
  
Given the presence of institutional adaptation, what are the plausible rival 
explanations for the development of the network and the increased amount of 
decentralization?  Among the first plausible explanations to consider is the tenet that all 
networks per se become more decentralized with increasing complexity. To say that there 
is a linear relationship between complexity and decentralization would be an assumption. 
If the assumption were true, then one could predict the level of decentralization given the 
network’s size and the number of organizations it contained, whether the growth curve 
was linear, geometric or even exponential.  
The results, as outlined in Chapter four, reveal that it is not just the size of the 
network that matters in determining its level of decentralization, but the pattern of 
decentralization. In the network of CCCs and CERTs in the state of Florida, different 
regions developed at different rates, despite being exposed to the same hurricanes. For 
example, the number of CERTs in Broward County grew from three in 2002 to six in 
2005 and then to twenty in 2011, while the number of CERTs in Orlando grew from two 
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to four. The growth pattern is indicative of a non-linear relationship between complexity 
and decentralization among the different regions of the state. Given the presence of 
several hurricanes crossing the state why were there not more CCCs and CERTs 
founded? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this dissertation but would 
be an interesting topic for further research.  
A second plausible explanation is that the development of the network of CCCs 
and CERTs over the last ten years is simply the product of the devolution of 
responsibility from higher to lower levels of government. For example, the share or 
proportion of CERTs connected to the statewide CCC decreased from .429 in 2002 to 
.274 in 2005 and by nearly half from .274 in 2005 to .134 in 2011. A uniform pattern of 
devolution should also depict a regular pattern with each county maintaining their Citizen 
Corps Council. This is not the case, according to the most recent map of CCCs in the 
state of Florida (Figure7); only sixteen counties have CCCs. Why this is the case is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation but would be a notable topic for further research. 
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Figure 7: CCCs in the State of Florida (2011) 
 
 
Source: Citizen Corps Council Website found at 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/CouncilMapIndex.do?submitState&state=FL 
 
A third reason why devolution is not a viable explanation for the development of 
the network of CCCs and CERTs is that not all of the State’s CCCs were formed before 
their respective CERTs. As described in Chapter four, eighteen CERTs existed before the 
formation of the CCCs program and are still operating.  
 Overall, there is no single factor accounting for the pattern of variation in the 
development of CCCs and CERTS in the state of Florida during the last decade. All of 
these plausible alternative explanations (decentralization by nature, devolution of 
authority to local governments, hierarchy within programs) give a partial reason, but no 
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single or combination of these alternatives account for the non- linear development and 
the “emergent” behavior of CCCs and CERTs. There is no single overarching factor 
controlling this development. Given the presence of covariation, temporal precedence and 
the lack of plausible alternative explanations, the development of local homeland security 
networks most closely resembles that of a complex adaptive system.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
DEVELOPING A NARRATIVE FOR THE 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORKS: 
 
THE CASE OF SOUTH FLORIDA 
 
 How do local homeland security organizations respond to catastrophic events 
such as hurricanes and acts of terrorism?  Answering this question requires tracing the 
factors affecting the individuals and institutions planning, preparing, responding and 
recovering from natural and man- made disasters. The most important aspect of this 
response is these organizations’ ability to adapt to the uncertain nature of these “focusing 
events.”  
Responses to focal events such as the attacks of September 11th, 2001 or 
Hurricane Katrina revealed weaknesses inherent in the governmental organizations 
charged with responding to these natural and man-made disasters. As stated throughout 
my dissertation, the lack of coordination and cooperation among governmental 
organizations was one of the primary weaknesses revealed by these focal events. 
Furthermore, the lack of federal funds, the presence of a “one size fits all approach”, and 
the lack of a coherent risk assessment strategy (Frank and Reddick, 2006, 2) hampered 
implementation of institutional mandates especially at the local level.  
These events served as a wake up call for many local governments in this regard. 
In the case of South Florida, the wake up call came much earlier. One Miami Dade 
County official when asked what effect 9/11 had on how his organization responded to 
natural or man-made disasters stated: 
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Well, we actually I think learned our lessons long before September 11th in the State of 
Florida because of our vulnerability to natural disasters and, you know, to quote our chief 
at the time in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew hit us, you know, all the help that came was 
the best thing that ever happened to us and all the help that came was the worst thing that 
ever happened to us because it wasn’t coordinated.  (Senior Miami Dade Fire Official 
(4D)) 
 
 Thus the lack of coordination and communication are the main factors affecting 
how local homeland security organizations, plan, prepare, respond and recover from 
natural and man-made disasters.  When asked how this lack of communication and 
coordination affected emergency response before September 11th, the Miami Dade 
County Official stated:   
I mean prior to September 11th, everything was pretty much stove-piped, you know, law 
enforcement did their job, the Feds did their job, fire rescue did their job.  We’re seeing a 
lot of inter-discipline type communication, so I think – and I think that because of that, 
there’s a tremendous opportunity.  The gap is not that wide in closing this whole 
intelligence sharing part. (Senior Miami Dade Fire Official (4D))  
 
To better coordinate the communication and interaction of the individuals and 
institutions involved, a change was made in how natural and man-made disasters or 
“hazards” (DHS, 2004, ix) were managed. The change focused on an “event” centric 
approach which is based on the likelihood of potential incidents and their localization.  
The methodology is referred to as an “all hazards” approach in which natural and 
man- made disasters are treated the same for planning purposes and is the standard used 
by the United States Department of Homeland Security. The integral component of this 
“all hazards” approach is the National Incident Management System or NIMS, which was 
mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) on February 23, 2003 
and issued by President George W. Bush (DHS, 2004, 1).  When asked what affect NIMS 
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had on how they responded to natural and man-made disasters a second Miami Dade 
County official stated:  
There are things within NIMS that obviously we had to adopt and practice, you know, 
credentialing and typecasting and that kind of thing and making sure everybody attended 
all those NIMS classes, … .Yeah, we did have to, you know, do the formal training and 
the formal education process on there and, you know, implementing NIMS is a resource – 
resource – I don’t want to call it rich, but it’s a system that requires us to dedicate 
resources to be able to comply with it, so it is a little bit of a challenge to do it but, you 
know, we’re able to do it.  As far as our partners, when I talk about partners, we’re 
talking about our state, federal, local partners. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official 
(2B)) 
The National Incident Management System focuses on four aspects of an incident 
(preparation, prevention, response and recovery) and is designed to develop a “core set of 
concepts, principles, procedures” for dealing with disaster management for those officials 
managing homeland security related incidents, be they man-made or natural (DHS, 2004, 
2). The emphasis is placed on creating a high level of both “interoperability and 
compatibility” among those agencies called upon to deal with an incident or hazard, it is 
done through creating a system that has the optimal amount of both “flexibility and 
standardization” (DHS, 2004, 2). The regulatory framework is the administrative or 
institutional constraint within which all local homeland security organizations must 
operate.  
 A common response among local homeland security officials was the increased 
amount of work necessary to comply with the National Incident Management System. 
Below is an example of how one county adapted to the NIMS: 
Well what it did was it, I mean, the federal government put mandates on you – certain 
things that you had to do, you know, we had to write a comprehensive emergency 
management plan that flows along with the counties and the states.  That comprehensive 
emergency management plan – you’ll hear the term CEMP – basically is a blueprint for 
how we handle disasters, and you can see the document right there.  It’s a nice thick 
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document and we follow it, you know, prior to Katrina there wasn’t anything so after ’05 
we created one, we wrote it. (Senior Miami Dade Fire Official (2B)) 
 
Mandated or Improvised Change: The role of CCCs and CERTs in measuring 
adaptation among local homeland security organizations  
 
 National Incident Management System was not the only response to the focal 
events mentioned above. In addition to the NIMS protocols, programs were created to 
assist local governments in complying with the new institutional framework mandated by 
Department of Homeland Security. These federal programs did not replace local or state 
programs but were often superimposed onto existing state and local efforts. There are two 
types of responses or changes that have occurred over the last decade: (1) change that has 
a result of Federal or state mandates and (2) improvised change that has occurred as a 
result of shifting conditions brought on by focal events such as man-made and natural 
disasters. 
 For example, changes occurring due to institutional mandates can be seen in the 
response of local governments to the implementation of the National Incident 
Management System. When Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) was 
issued in 2003, it mandated that all local homeland security organizations that desired to 
receive funding become NIMS compliant.  The mandate required several actions 
including the adoption of common radio protocols and the adoption of a common radio 
frequency, the 800 MHz frequency, for all emergency management personnel. It 
mandated the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) as the standard protocol for 
handling the responses to natural and man-made disasters. This can be seen in the 
response of a Broward County official interviewed in April of 2010 when he stated: 
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We were very, very fortunate when we were faced with the challenges like everybody 
else of having to, you know, come on board with certain terminology, etc., radio protocol, 
operational connectiveness to the different public safety entities.  We were very fortunate.  
We are well ahead of the curve for a lot of agencies.  We were already using ICS anyway.  
We had been since the 80’s. (Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 In addition to the mandated changes in protocols, there were also improvised 
changes which included the development of organizations at the local level. One 
prominent example is the creation of the federal program entitled Citizen Corps. Initiated 
in January 2002, the Citizen Corps program was designed to: 
…harness the power of every individual through education, training, and volunteer 
service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats 
of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disasters of all kinds. 
(http://www.citizencorps.gov/about/ accessed March 5, 2012) 
 
These organizations operate through state, local and tribal councils are designed to:  
  
Build on community strengths to implement the Citizen Corps preparedness programs 
and carry out a local strategy to involve government, community leaders, and citizens in 
all-hazards preparedness and resilience. (http://www.citizencorps.gov/about/ accessed 
March 5, 2012) 
 
Combined with the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program, an 
affiliated organization of the Citizen Corps program, these programs serve to supplement 
the existing resources of local first responders before, during and after a man-made or 
natural disaster. Both the CCC and CERT programs are staffed by local volunteers and 
must be sponsored by a local official such as first responder or other county/municipal 
officials. Thus analyzing the pattern of development of these local voluntary programs is 
essential in documenting the pattern of local improvised change or adaptation to focal 
events.  
 Accordingly, my dissertation has documented the development of two sets of 
homeland security organizations, CCCs and Community Emergency Response Teams 
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(CERTs). Taken together these organizations form a network that must respond to a 
number of institutional mandates within the context of budgetary and political 
constraints. As with the growth of the network generally, the response of these 
organizations is the result of a number of factors. Among these factors include                         
(1) institutional mandates such as the NIMS, (2) the presence of flat or decreasing 
budgetary resources and personnel, and (3) the tensions that exist between elected and 
appointed officials as they seek to implement the mandates of both the federal and state 
governments.  
 These mandated and improvised changes tend to mix together since not all 
jurisdictions have the resources, either in terms of budget or personnel, to comply with 
the mandates. This is especially true of rural jurisdictions where small groups of officials, 
led by the fire or police chief, are often charged with implementing the National Incident 
Management System.  Thus both mandated and improvised changes are evidence of 
adaptations of local homeland security organizations to their institutional, budgetary and 
political environments.  
 Despite these limitations, all jurisdictions are required to respond when natural or 
man-made disasters occur. In addition to changes mandated by the new institutional 
framework (i.e., NIMS), there have been “improvised changes” or adaptations as well, 
including an increasing reliance on the series of mutual aid agreements signed decades 
earlier beginning in the 1980’s. These changes were not mandated by NIMS but 
happened as the network of organizations has become increasingly complex and 
decentralized. One example of this improvised change is the development of “automatic 
aid” in which units are dispatched to an incident based on their geographic proximity, 
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regardless of whether the incident lies within the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
organization. The implementation of automatic aid agreements in Broward County is one 
example of these adaptations as stated by the following Broward County Official:  
One of the things that - to take it to the next level is we’ve started to do and you’ll see 
possibly in your discussions with others is, you know, local agreements that allow for 
automatic aid as opposed to mutual aid. Mutual aid is essentially the first step in you 
would be requesting assistance … automatic aid [consists of ] where we would be able to 
see in our dispatch center on the CAD screens, we would be able to see their vehicles, 
their units, their – and they would likewise be able to see ours so if we needed assistance 
from another fire engine from Westin or something we would be able to essentially, just 
like there are people dispatching our units, we would be able to dispatch their units from 
a previously agreed upon protocol that would allow for that… (Senior Broward County 
Fire Official (3C)) 
 
Improvised adaptations are not limited to mutual aid agreements. An example of 
this adaptation can be found in the response to the Gulf Oil Spill in April 2010 in the area 
of Escambia County. Despite little institutional development of the network before the 
Gulf Oil Spill, there was only one CERT present before 2010; two CCCs were formed in 
the same month, April, in which the Macando Well platform exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico. The development was not the result of an institutional mandate as the CCC 
program is driven by voluntary participation and must be coordinated by local emergency 
management officials. Moreover, the network of organizations that developed in the 
wake of the Gulf Oil Spill coordinated the actions of 1,550 volunteers logging 16,601 
volunteer hours in 20107 
The adaptations documented above did not occur independently. To better 
understand the context in which they occur, these adaptations will be evaluated in light of 
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three types of constraints; (1) budgetary, (2) institutional, and (3) political. The following 
three sections of this chapter will investigate in detail the presence of these constraints.  
Budgetary Constraints: 
Lack of funding has been a major complication in the NIMS implementation. The 
lack of federal funding, in particular, was due in part to the mechanisms used to fund 
municipalities. A Miami Dade County official stated that funding was among the greatest 
challenges that faced his jurisdiction, and federal funding was the hardest to get due to 
the amount of paper work that was required:  
Our greatest challenge, I believe, is always going to be funding.  I’m sure you’ll hear that.  
With funding comes a lot of cooperation, so once we’re able to secure enough funding for 
our region, I think you get a very good buy in from all our partners, so I’d say funding is 
always going to be number one. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (2B)) 
 
A series of directives entitled Homeland Security Presidential Directives 
established the funding mechanisms that regulate the conduct of homeland security 
policy. The main directive governing homeland security financing is the Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8.  According to HSPB8, in order to receive funding, 
states and localities have to adopt the National Incident Management System (NIMS) in 
responding to homeland security incidents (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/welcome.htm).   
To measure compliance with NIMS, DHS evaluates each municipality on a series 
of twenty-eight “mission critical” functions. Once approved, municipalities’ funding is 
coordinated by the Office of State and local Government Coordination and Preparedness 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 This data comes from the Citizen Corps website, 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/showCouncil.do?id=46591 and 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/cc/showCouncil.do?id=47762 accessed on March 4, 2012 
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(SLGCP).  The fundamental issue that confronts local homeland security decision makers 
is that they must devote time and staff to a resource intensive, bureaucratic process.  
When asked about the effect of NIMS on their operating procedures, a Miami 
Dade county official made the following statement:  
There are things within NIMS that obviously we had to adopt and practice, you know, 
credentialing and typecasting and that kind of thing and making sure everybody attended 
all those NIMS classes, the 700, 800, 100, 200, 300, 400 classes depending on the level 
of your supervision. Yeah, we did have to, you know, do the formal training and the 
formal education process (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (2B)) 
 
Another Miami Dade county official echoed this sentiment in terms of the amount 
of training required to comply with the new regulatory framework created by NIMS: 
It’s the Incident Command System, which required by the National Incident Management 
System and so every one of our employees is trained in ICS depending on the level 
whatever their level is in the organization, so - which is quite an undertaking when that 
when that was mandated, but it has been accomplished…(Senior Miami Dade County 
Fire Official (1A)) 
  
Like I said, we evaluate and look at from a state perspective, the state emergency 
response plan that I discussed and how we can tweak it and how we can change it and 
what were some of the lessons learned even down to simple things like creating a form 
that is easier to track and to put in there the requirements that FEMA will need later on 
for reimbursement which doesn’t seem like that critical but if you were the individual 
charged with having to provide all of the information that FEMA requires, that is a huge 
task. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (1A)) 
 
An analysis of the total amount of resources reveals that federal resources in 
terms of grants and training amount to approximately 10% of all homeland security 
outlays from the Department of Homeland Security, despite the increased operational 
tempo of homeland security related incidents and exercises. For example, in 2006, 
funding for local agencies totaled approximately 9% of the $41 billion for the FY2006 
DHS budget. 
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Figure 8: Total and State and Local Government Coordination Program SLGCP 
Funding for FY 2004 – FY 2006 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
The National Governor’s Association and the United States Conference of 
Mayors estimate that states and localities have spent approximately $8.6 billion on 
homeland security related projects in 2006; with  cities alone spending $2.6 billion 
(Report by NGA and USCM). Despite an increase in overall funding of 15% from 
FY2004 – FY2006, funding for SLGCP decreased by 15%. This trend has continued. In 
FY 2009, grants were $4,245,700 or 7% of the overall DHS budget (FY 2009 Budget in 
Brief from the DHS, p.17-19). In FY 2010, total FEMA grants were $4,165,200 or 7% of 
the total DHS budget (FY 2010 Budget in Brief from the DHS, p. 15-17).  Funding in 
FY2011 remained at FY 2010 levels due to passage of a continuing resolution.  
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Figure 9: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Funding Breakdown for SLGCP 
(In Millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Despite the increased operational speed since 2001, and especially during the 
2004-2005 hurricane seasons, funding for local programs from the DHS actually declined 
as a percentage of overall DHS funding. During the period FY2004 – FY2006, funding 
decreased markedly for all programs except UASI/TIPP (Urban Area Security 
Initiative/Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program).  Program funding for State and 
Local Grants (S&L Grants)  decreased by 49% while Fire Act grants decreased by 33% 
and State and Local Training and Education funds decreased by 34%. In contrast, funding 
for UASI/TIPP has increased by 124%. Figure 9 presents these trends.  
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The level of funding is not the only facet of homeland security financing that 
changed during this time period. In FY2004, State and Local grants comprised a majority 
of the funding coming from SLGCP. In FY2006, this pattern changed significantly with a 
majority of funding going to Urban Areas and Targeted Infrastructure. The trend is 
depicted in Figure 10 below.  
Figure 10: Total USDHS State and local funding by program type for:  
FY 2004 to FY 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the 2004-2005 hurricane seasons, funding mechanisms have continued to 
evolve and yet the funding levels have remained the same or even decreased. In FY 2011, 
more than $3 billion in grants were distributed which represented approximately 7% of 
the revised enacted FY2009 DHS budget (FY 2011 Budget in Brief, DHS, 2011, 13 and 
111). Beginning in FY 2009, the various programs were consolidated into a new grants 
system and put under the management of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  Under the new system, the National Preparedness Guidelines were used for 
allocating funds.  
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These guidelines are the final product of a year’s long planning process that began 
with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which was issued on December 17, 
2003. They are designed to accomplish five objectives (1) “organize and synchronize” 
efforts to fund priorities: (2) “guide investments [in] national preparedness”; (3) 
“incorporate lessons learned from past disasters into national preparedness priorities; (4) 
“facilitate investments” in priorities that were based on capabilities and risk assessment; 
and (5) “establish metrics” to evaluate the overall readiness of the “nation’s preparedness 
capability to respond to major events, especially those involving acts of terrorism”. 
(DHS, n.a., paragraph 1 www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm) 
The significance of homeland security grants for local governments is 
demonstrated in the following comment:  
The Department of Homeland Security has grants available to us through FEMA and the 
State Homeland Security Grant Program - even though, in my opinion, is not 
implemented right in the state of Florida - does offer us some opportunities to bring in 
homeland security dollars into this region.  The UASI program also brings much needed 
support to the region along with all the other – the port security, the transit security, 
Operation Stonegarden will also enhance our abilities, but all of the homeland security 
grants are good sources for funding for our region. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire 
Official (2B)) 
 
The fact that total DHS funding for state and local governments has comprised 
less than 10 % of total DHS budgetary outlays the increased operational tempo of natural 
and man-made disasters has led officials to wear “multiple hats”.  Moreover, declining 
budgetary resources combined with the increased operational speed,
mandated by several natural disasters, has led to the creation of new programs such as the 
Community Emergency Response Teams and  Citizen Corps Councils.  It has also led to 
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an increased reliance on existing mutual aid agreements, which will be discussed in more 
depth in the next section.  
Institutional Constraints: 
In addition to the mentioned budgetary constraints, there are several institutional 
constraints in the form of a new regulatory framework that has been erected to deal with 
man-made and natural disasters. As in the introduction to this chapter, among the greatest 
issues facing local homeland security officials responding to focal events was the lack of 
communication and coordination among the various organizations involved in emergency 
management. When asked what the greatest homeland security issues were facing his 
jurisdiction, a Miami Dade County official said: 
The most important issue for us is intelligence and sharing intelligence information.  
We’ve done a lot of work on preparation and equipping our people and training, but I still 
think there’s a huge gap in intelligence sharing, especially between the law enforcement 
side and the responder side. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
When asked what the greatest opportunity was, the Miami Dade County official  
 
responded: 
 
Well, I think opportunity wise I think we have made - since September 11th - have made 
tremendous strides in, how do I want to say it, creating an environment where all the 
stakeholders meet.  We have – we’ve created these Regional Domestic Security Task 
Forces. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
Overall, this Miami Dade county official described the institutional constraints in terms 
of governmental response in this way: 
The challenges I think we’re getting into now is the whole law of recency and everybody 
seems to, you know, as time goes, forgets about how bad things could be and budgets get 
tighter, grants get less, and so the challenge is, I see is keeping the momentum to say 
listen, it’s not a matter of if but when and continuing to make sure we do everything we 
can to prepare. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
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To deal with these “focal events” and especially with the new regulatory 
architecture, these officials have created a new organizational framework which serves to 
connect all organizations involved in responding to man- made and natural disasters. The 
new organizational framework, or community, does not supplant but superimposes a new 
regulatory framework on top of these organizations. When asked to elaborate on the 
creation of these organizations, entitled Regional Domestic Security Task Forces, Senior 
Miami Dade County official responded: 
The State of Florida – I’m not sure if every state does it, but the State of Florida after 
September 11th then coordinated a joint effort between the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, that’s kind of the lead agency, FDLE, and the local sheriff’s offices.  Every 
county in Florida, all 67, have a sheriff’s office, created Regional Domestic Security Task 
Forces.  There are seven in the state. They created them along the lines of our Division of 
Emergency Management Zones, so the seven regions have already existed…(Senior 
Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
When asked to elaborate on what the role of the Regional Domestic Security Task 
Forces were and what these Domestic Security Task Forces are, he stated: 
I can perhaps show you a picture of how it’s broken down, but essentially there are 
various work groups and then an Executive Board, and it’s just – in a nutshell basically a 
multi-disciplined group that meets with their disciplines and then collectively.  In other 
words, as an example, in May, we’ll have our quarterly meeting, so I chair the fire group, 
so I’ll be meeting with all my counterparts from Palm Beach to Monroe County about 
fire issues and Law Enforcement is doing their thing and Marine Operations is doing their 
thing, Agriculture is involved – the agroterrorism issue, health department is involved, all 
these entities will meet for a couple hours on their issues and then we all convene and 
meet collectively as a region – what are we doing collectively so with the idea being I’m 
talking about communication issues, police and agriculture and health might have the 
same communications issues so we try to channel things towards a joint effort. (Senior 
Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
The Senior Miami Dade fire official also elaborated on the role of federal funding in this 
new regulatory framework: 
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Coupled with the UASI which is the Urban Area Security Initiative, which is kind of the 
pot of money that allows us to operate, really forces all the players to the table because, 
you know, we would like to say that it’s a noble cause to just meet and make sure we do 
the right thing, but when you talk about money and everybody has an opportunity to take 
a piece of the pie, it tends to bring the players to the table and hold them there a lot longer 
so we’ve been able to develop these relationships through these Domestic Security Task 
Forces, and then those all combine and work up towards the Domestic Security Oversight 
Committee, the DSOC we call it in the State of Florida, so each region then is represented 
at the DSOC… ((Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
When asked to describe in detail what this DSOC was, the Senior Miami Dade Official  
 
stated: 
 
The DSOC takes the core disciplines – law enforcement, fire, health, and critical 
infrastructure and each region then has a representative of those disciplines that work 
together at the DSOC (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
In other words, each of the seven regions of the state has a representative from 
each of the organizations involved in emergency management. These regional 
representatives are then assigned to work with other regional representatives at the state 
level. It is important to note here that these officials are not employed by the DSOC, but 
by local, or in some cases regional, organizations involved in homeland security policy. 
Their responsibilities in the DSOC, or in their region for that matter, are in addition to 
whatever duties they have at their respective organizations.  
The new regulatory framework is a result of concerted efforts on the part of 
officials to increase the level of communication and coordination between not just fire 
officials, or even law enforcement officials, but all those officials involved in emergency 
preparedness and management. A common mechanism used to increase coordination and 
communication is the use of mutual aid agreements. These agreements have existed for 
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decades. Many of these agreements in South Florida date back to the response and 
recovery related Hurricane Andrew in 1992.   
According to FEMA, mutual aid consists of:  
Agreements between agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions that provide a mechanism 
to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, 
and other associated services (FEMA website accessed at 
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ResourceMngmnt.shtm) 
 
The primary objective is to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support 
prior to, during, and after an incident. 
When asked to elaborate on the use of mutual aid agreements in South Florida, 
the Broward County official responded: 
We do have mutual aid agreements with – all of the agencies in Broward County belong 
to the Fire Chiefs Association of Broward County and as such, they were the 
promulgators of the mutual aid agreement back in, again, in the 80’s, so since then all of 
the agencies in the county have signed on to that system, and there’s a universal 
agreement, a universal service that goes with that.  One of the things that – and it has 
been a very successful program. Mutual aid is essentially the first step in would be 
requesting assistance (Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 
Thus mutual aid agreements are predicated on the knowledge that local assistance in the 
form of resources and personnel from other jurisdictions and municipalities or even 
states, will arrive before federal assistance. The development of the State Emergency 
Response Plan (SERP) was in part a response to focal events and predates the 
requirements of NIMS. In particular, the Senior Miami- Dade County Fire Official (2B) 
stated that experience has led them to increase the amount of communication and 
coordination between local organizations.  
It has been tested over and over again.  It has been proven very successful through the 
nine hurricanes in 2004/2005 to the wildfires in ‘98 and ‘03 and then ’07, so we’ve really 
tested that system, and locally within the county, mutual aid exists between all of the 
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agencies, and while there are no formal documents, it’s something that just is inherent to 
provide the support. (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (2B)) 
 
It’s crucial being a city of our size that we have mutual aid with the surrounding 
governments… but we also like to share resources and capabilities if they’re needed 
elsewhere as well, so it’s pretty critical.” (Senior Miami Dade County Fire Official (2B)) 
 
When asked to describe how his organization has responded to NIMS operational 
requirements, the Senior Broward County Fire Official related his personal experience 
with the previous fire chief  
Well, he came in ’97, so he was here [when] 9/11 went down, and obviously still here 
when Hurricane Wilma, so he grew us through a bunch of this stuff, the succession 
planning in the building and the redundant systems, etc.,  so to go back to the operational 
question, yeah.  We’ve implemented an Emergency Management division that reports 
directly to the Fire Chief.  (Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 
When asked what role the new Emergency Management coordinator played he outlined 
his responsibilities in this way: 
He has been tasked with community outreach, community preparation for storms.  He’s 
gotten nearly – I think its right around 100 CERT volunteers through the CERT program, 
and I don’t know if you’re familiar… (Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 
Elaborating on the role of the CERT program in his jurisdiction, the Broward 
County official detailed the history of the program and how it would operate in the event 
of a natural disaster: 
…it’s really a unique program.  It came out of LA originally many, many years ago but 
what it basically does is it takes citizen volunteers – it’s the Community Emergency 
Response Teams - CERT, so what it does is it takes these volunteers through classroom 
sessions, hands on sessions, they learn CPR, first aid, light search and rescue, all of kinds 
of, you know, communications techniques, radio protocol and basically they are 
geographically located out in the community in groups, so we’ve got several groups in 
target areas in the community so that if an event goes down – tornado touches down, 
hurricane, something like that – these people already have equipment, the uniforms, 
they’ve got radios, they can talk directly to our EOC, directly with our Emergency 
Official: Management Coordinator, and they’ll give an onsite report of damage, injuries, 
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flooding, any of that kind of thing from right in the community where they live. (Senior 
Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 
Specifically, the Broward County Official detailed the role of these CERT 
volunteers in a natural disaster in this way: 
We’re pulling in volunteers so and then again, the key part of it is they’re out there in the 
community in their neighborhoods where the people know them, so if they come up to 
their neighbors and they’re, you know, they see that they’re flooded or they’re lightly 
trapped or they need first aid, it’s not like a stranger, you know, coming up to them.. 
(Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 
The Broward county official also went on to state the volunteers for CERTs were 
“self selected”, specifically that “they sign up” and gave his assessment of the program 
and how it has changed his “operation”.   
 It’s a nationally known program.  It’s federally supported through FEMA, and we’ve 
gotten a couple of grants that have supported the equipment and the education for that 
and it has been very successful, very well received in the community, very well supported 
by the commission and the city administration, so that’s part of how the operation has 
changed. (Senior Broward County Fire Official (3C)) 
 
The aftermath of 9/11 produced an influx of citizen participation which needed to 
be channeled. This was done to help support local emergency managers. According to the 
CCC guide, published in 2002, the purpose of CCCs is to:  
Develop a systematic, efficient, and effective method for providing public education and 
training opportunities, stimulating wide-spread participation, and organizing volunteer 
programs to increase the safety of your community. (CCC guide, 2002, DHS, 12). 
 
Citizen Corps Councils are formed by concerned citizens and must be “endorsed” 
by a local elected official, or city or county administrator.  One can use existing resources 
and organizations to start a CCC if they are firmly established in the community. The 
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geographic boundaries and membership are determined not by federal fiat but by the 
needs of local leaders in the governmental, nongovernmental and private sectors.   
Membership is not limited to those involved in emergency management, but 
includes multiple community groups from faith-based organizations, transportation 
outlets (airports, bus and rail), multicultural organizations, and even local media 
executives (CCC guide, 2002, DHS, 12):   
The primary qualification to participating on the Council is making a commitment to 
educate the public on safety, to help citizens take an active role in protecting themselves 
from harm, to teach citizens what to do in the event of a crisis, and to expand volunteer 
opportunities that will make the community safer. (CCC guide, 2002, DHS, 12). 
 
State and local level CCCs were created on an as needed basis in response to 
community desire and focal events, such as hurricanes, acts of terrorism and wildfires.  In 
chapter four, it was shown how CCCs and CERTs developed in Broward County through 
the years 1996 to 2011 as a reaction to focal events. The first five years of the network, 
from 1996 to 2000, saw slow but consistent growth with three CERTs being formed in 
Fort Lauderdale (1996), Pompano Beach (1997) and Hallandale Beach (1999). The 
CERTs; however, were not connected to each other but served as stand- alone 
organizations.    
The next five years, 2001–2005, represent a significant period in the development 
of the network for several reasons. Seven hurricanes hit the state of Florida during the 
years of 2004 and 2005 with Hurricanes Rita, Katrina, and Wilma affecting Broward 
County in 2005.  From 2001 to 2005, the network grew to include one CCC, the 
statewide CCC, and five CERTs.  Also, the amount of interconnectedness increased as 
the network became more complex.  
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The period of the most significant growth occurred in the last five years, 2006 to 
2011. During this period the number of organizations grew from five to nineteen. In 
2008, the DHS issued a mandate that every county needed to form at least one CERT. 
Between 2008 and 2011, two more CCCs and fourteen additional CERTs were formed 
and interconnectedness increased significantly.  
In essence, the evolution of mutual aid agreements among first responders, the 
CERTs and the CCCs that coordinate their actions represent the growth of new policy 
communities to deal with the institutional constraints that have and continue to exist 
(Stone, 2002, 20).   
Political Constraints 
In addition to budgetary and institutional constraints, there are also political 
constraints embedded in emergency management. Among the most important constraints 
are the different roles played by elected officials and first responders. Elected officials are 
generally familiar with emergency management while first responders are technical 
specialists. Each group has their own perspective concerning the implementation of 
emergency management. Elected officials, as representatives of the general public, are 
concerned not only with the objective facts and actions on the ground, but the perception 
of these actions in the larger society (i.e., role of accountability and role of the media). 
First responders have a different mandate in terms of their mission to protect the health 
and safety of the public regardless of the perception of these actions in the larger society. 
The difference in roles leads to a natural tension between the two groups as they respond 
to focal events.  Each of the groups has a separate, though not always conflicting goal, as 
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they respond to focal events. One former elected official described this tension in the 
following manner: 
There is a personality of a mindset to that that I think many people would agree tends to 
let us take control and just move out of the way and let us do our job.  You don’t have to 
worry about it and we’ll get it done and then we’ll pass you back the – your job or your 
role in it or whatever, and I don’t think, I mean as our natural and manmade disasters 
have escalated especially in our most recent years, I think that model probably isn’t very 
productive anymore.  (Senior Palm Beach County Official (6F)). 
 
The difference in perception also leads to a difference in management style. When 
asked what the greatest challenge facing municipalities was, the Palm Beach county 
official responded: 
You can plan extensively and exhaustively for things that you know are going to occur or 
things – anticipating how things might occur or putting tried and true systems onto 
perceived threats and operational responses to those threats, but perhaps the biggest fear 
would be something that is not contemplated or something that is not – if contemplated, 
not scaled appropriately to an actual magnitude of an event that might occur, so that’s a 
challenge. (Senior Palm Beach County Official (6F)). 
 
Since elected officials are not as familiar with the technical details of emergency 
management, the official also emphasized the need to work together with first responders. 
In particular, the need for coordination and communication was seen as a central issue as 
illustrated in the following comments: 
I see the challenge as a communication and relationship equation that better defines and 
shares amongst intergovernmental jurisdictions.  (Senior Palm Beach County Official 
(6F)). 
 
When asked to elaborate on this statement the Palm Beach county official stated: 
 
 That’s what we do is look for those commonalities and by design we’re trying to find 
how do we break down the silos, how do we break down the jurisdictional barriers and 
share information and leverage resources in such a way to get the best return on 
investment for a host of reasons which include not only efficiently responding to disaster, 
but at the same time trying to make government and government systems more 
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affordable, more implementable and appropriate. (Senior Palm Beach County Official 
(6F)). 
 
These comments were echoed by a Miami Dade County official, when asked to 
describe how the events of September 11th affected emergency management efforts: 
I mean prior to September 11th, everything was pretty much stove-piped, you know, law 
enforcement did their job, the Feds did their job, fire rescue did their job. (Senior Miami 
Dade County Fire Official (4D)) 
 
The pressure of the political constraints lies in the fact that the elected officials 
will be held accountable in the public domain. Their actions or inactions will be 
scrutinized in view of the aftermath of the focal event. Among the most important aspects 
of this constraint is the relationship between the elected officials, first responders, and the 
public; specifically, the responsibility of the elected officials to society, as demonstrated 
by the following comments: 
It’s not all about can we assign a larger portion of budget to this or can we put more 
people on it or can we double production out of the factory of mitigative tools.  It’s a 
mindset and a communications component that I think our real challenge will be how do 
you instill educationally and from the sense of a societal responsibility appropriate 
responses that you want out of everybody that’s involved in the system to respond to 
whatever it is that occurs. (Senior Palm Beach County Official (6F)). 
 
The need for the public to support themselves in their neighborhoods is reflected 
in the following statement: 
They immediately go to work at repairing that which is around them and I’ve seen that 
observationally with people in hurricanes.  While we’re sitting in the bunker worrying 
about how we get heavy equipment down street A or street B or back into inaccessible 
area C, the people that live there are already out there picking stuff up.  They’re already 
firing up their chain saws.  They’re already carting debris to the curb.  They’re already 
assisting neighbors.  They’re already doing things by default that we’re contemplating or 
planning on doing, (Senior Palm Beach County Official (6F)). 
 
When asked to explain what this meant in practice for emergency managers the senior  
 
Palm Beach Official stated the following: 
91 
 
 
 I think that’s a very imperative lesson for planners and system designers to keep 
cognizant of in a way that what their systems and their resources ought to be doing is 
leveraging and enhancing and incentivizing that versus coming from the point of view of 
we’ve got a better mousetrap.  Move out of our way and let us move in and take over 
because they’re never there when it starts. (Senior Palm Beach County Official (6F)). 
 
The elected officials operate on the basis on consent given by those who elected them. 
First responders are in charge with protecting the public from whichever incident occurs. 
Combining the constraints  
The key to understanding the interaction of first responders and CERT volunteers 
lies in viewing their interactions as the result of a complex adaptive system with mutual 
aid, CCCs, and CERTs representing adaptations to the budgetary, institutional and 
political constraints.  They are often behind the curve and see response as a linear process 
where they plan, prepare, respond, and recover, when it is a complex multifaceted 
process. It requires elected officials, first responders who understand the interactions 
between the fiscal pressures facing local governments, the institutional pressures of 
working within a new regulatory framework, and the political pressures of bringing 
together different levels of government with different perspectives and agendas. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE: 
 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF VIEWING LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 
IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
 
September 11, 2011 is an important date not just for the nation in general, but for 
emergency management in particular.  The months leading up to this anniversary 
produced a spate of articles concerning the 9/11 attacks. These articles have focused 
primarily on the progress made and steps yet to be taken. What most of these articles 
reveal is that there has been a significant amount of effort, both in terms of time, 
resources and staff, devoted to ensuring that another attack does not happen. In addition 
to the estimated $400 billion which have been spent on “security” in the last decade 
(Trotta, 2011), there is a new cabinet level department, the Department of Homeland 
Security, which is the third largest in the federal government, behind the Departments of 
Defense and Veterans Affairs (DHS  Budget in brief, FY2012, 37 and Zakaria, 2011). At 
the local level, the adoption of NIMS has produced significant changes in how local 
governments operate and how they respond to natural and man-made disasters. 
All of this effort leads inevitably to the question “Is it working?” In particular, are 
the reforms working as they were intended? Do they prevent or at least mitigate the 
damage that will result from a future attack or natural disaster? The answer to this 
question must be equivocal. Yes, we are “safer” than we were; but no, we are not 
“completely prepared.”  The most important reason for this equivocation includes the 
scarcity of focal events either natural or man-made to test the system developed. Since 
the 2004-2005 hurricane seasons, there has been only one focal event that has affected 
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the state of Florida and that is the Gulf Oil Spill of 2010. The best way to test this system 
short of evaluating its performance in an actual focal event is in the use of full scale 
training exercises. Federal Emergency Management Agency conducts a series of these 
exercises through the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) and 
state and regional organizations also hold their own exercise. Furthermore, Objectives 17 
and 18 of the FY 2009 NIMS compliance objectives, mandate planning and participation 
in such exercises (FEMA, 2009, 1).  Despite all the training and the founding of dozens 
of organizations, their effectiveness in an actual focal event is also largely untried in most 
areas of the state.  
Despite this fact, the state and indeed the country has moved from a state of 
relative ignorance to one that is “ever vigilant”. In essence, we are experiencing a “new 
normal” (Trotta, 2011). There has been a shift in attitude, even of focus, in which 
governments at all levels have recognized the need to change from a “culture of need to 
know” to one of “need to share” (Zakaria, 2011). Emblematic of these changes is a 
statement made by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, who declared in the 
first State of Homeland Security Address on January 27, 2011: 
“The kinds of threats we now face demonstrate that our homeland security is a shared 
responsibility. Only a "whole nation approach" will bring us to the level of security and 
resilience we require.” 
(DHS website accessed at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1296152572413.shtm) 
 
This “new normal” however, has many of the characteristics of the “old normal” 
where governments, due to budgetary, institutional and political constraints, respond to 
the latest “focal event” with incremental approaches that often leave them behind the 
curve. They see emergency management as a linear process in which we plan, prepare, 
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respond and recover.  This is true at every level of government but especially, the federal 
level. 
Nine out of the forty-one recommendations from the 9/11 Commission Report has 
yet to be enacted. Of these, the most important to local first responders is the continued 
lack of a common communication system for police, fire and other emergency 
management personnel in less-populated areas of the United States (Zakaria, 2011).  New 
funding limitations have also been enacted to deal with the increased budgetary 
constraints brought on by the economic downturn felt throughout the economy since 
2008. This is true even at the federal level with projected spending on local preparedness 
projected to remain at the same level or less (DHS Budget in Brief, 2012), as discussed in 
chapter six. 
Despite the partial implementation of these recommendations, there is evidence 
that local first responders have created novel methods of increasing cooperation and 
communication in the event of a natural or man- made disaster. Increased reliance on 
mutual aid agreements and the continued development of the network of CCCs and 
CERTs in the state of Florida are examples of this trend.  Despite budgetary, institutional 
and political constraints, local first responders and the volunteers who have assisted them 
have adapted to this “new normal”. 
Limitations of the study  
Given the continued presence of these constraints and the likelihood of yet 
unforeseen natural and man-made disasters, how can local first responders get ahead of 
the curve in terms of their planning, preparing, responding and recovering from natural 
and man- made disasters? 
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At least a partial answer lies in changing the way public administrators of all 
levels evaluate these focal events. In particular, it is in adopting a system in which first 
responders and the volunteers who assist them are seen as “actors” in a complex adaptive 
system which responds to feedback and adjusts its strategy to its environment. Employing 
Social Network Analysis is a first step in revealing the “emergent” behavior within the 
system that occurs before, during and after a natural or man- made disaster. The analyses 
conducted in this study have revealed how first responders are adapting to the budgetary, 
institutional, and political constraints, allowing them to be more flexible and proactive in 
how they prepare, plan, respond and recover from disasters. The presence of these 
constraints is not limited to the network of CCCs and CERTs; however, there are many 
other actors who can and should be included, but were beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Among the actors that should be included are: nongovernmental 
organizations, private sector businesses and tribal organizations that interact with local 
homeland security organizations.  
The current project analyzed the network of organizations composed of CCCs and 
CERTs in the state of Florida from the years 2002-2011. Only organizations registered at 
the official Citizen Corps Website were used in collecting data for the social network 
analysis. Also, for both conceptual and methodological reasons, this analysis was limited 
to only two measures of centrality, degree and betweenness centrality. Conceptually, 
social network analysis is seen as the best tool to model complex adaptive systems, like 
the network of CCCs and Community Emergency Response Teams. Methodologically, 
social network analysis is seen as the best tool available to track the development of these 
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two sets of organizations and especially the patterns of interconnections that exist among 
them. 
As a result, this dissertation did not conduct a statistical analysis of the attributes 
of these organizations, but concentrated on the pattern of interconnections among them. 
This dissertation specifically does not address the quality or richness of the 
communication between the organizations and individuals involved in this network. 
Furthermore, this dissertation does not analyze the effectiveness of the response to focal 
events but rather depicts the development of the network over the years 2002-2011. An 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the network would require a more detailed analysis of 
the actors of the network and their attributes that are beyond the current scope of the 
dissertation. Examples of this analysis include: an analysis of the cliques (sub groups that 
are all connected to each other), the presence of homophyly or reciprocity among actors 
in the network and the amount of transitivity or clustering of like minded sets of 
organizations present in the network.  
This study was concerned with how two sets of organizations, CCCs and CERTs, 
adapted to three types of constraints; budgetary, institutional, and political as defined in 
chapter two of this dissertation. The conclusions from this research are only applicable to 
the network under study as defined in chapter three. Other networks may be similar, but a 
more robust statistical analysis of this network would be needed before any conclusions 
can be drawn regarding the patterns found in this study. 
Given the limitations of this study, further research is necessary to better 
understand the interconnections between CCCs and CERTS and other organizations. 
Examples of the next steps in this research agenda include expanding the number of 
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actors included in the social network analysis, to include other first responders such as 
medical personnel, or other organizations involved in planning, preparing, responding 
and recovering from natural and man- made disasters. 
Further studies can include not just discrete organizations, but also other groups 
or networks in the analysis. One such network of organizations is the growing number of 
“Fusion Centers” currently being created across the country. “Fusion Centers” serve as 
clearinghouses for information on the various types of threats impacting local, state and 
federal organizations. These centers exist at every level of government, but are 
concentrated at the local level. The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA) recently issued guidelines for local, regional, statewide, and federal fusion centers 
which are defined as “the collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 
resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their 
ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity (BJA, 
2009, 2).” There are currently seventy- two fusion centers operating in the United States 
that form what is termed the “national network.” (GAO, 201, 3) Evaluating the role of 
these “fusion centers” and the interconnections among them with other local emergency 
managers is an important next step in understanding the patterns present in the larger 
network of homeland security organizations. 
Implications for Public Administration Theory and Practice 
Finally, understanding how these officials and the organizations they represent 
have adapted to these constraints has important implications for public administration 
theory and practice. First, this dissertation reveals the importance of using methods that 
are able to capture the process of this adaptation. Using social network analysis, this 
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dissertation has evaluated the process of adaptation that has occurred among CCCs and 
CERTs over the last decade. Second, it is important to apply theories that focus on the 
patterns of interactions among practitioners not just their attributes. Using complex 
adaptive systems theory, this dissertation reveals how the pattern of development over the 
last decade of two sets of organizations: CCCs and CERTs was not linear in nature but 
rather the product of many interacting actors, which responded to feedback from their 
environment and adjusted their strategies or adapted to constraints they encountered.  
Overall, in terms of the theory and practice of public administration, my dissertation 
reveals the importance of analyzing not just the attributes of individual actors but the 
patterns of interactions among local officials and their effect on implementation of 
national and state level policy.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Matrices of Florida CCCs and CERTs for 2002 and 2005  
See Supplementary File 1 for the Matrix of Florida CCCs and CERTs for 2011 
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FL CCCs and CERTs 2002 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
(1) Statewide CCC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
(2) Rockledge CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) Fort Lauderdale CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) Pompano Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) Hallendale Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) Citrus County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(7) Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(8) Sun City Center CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(9) North Fort Myers CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(10) Miami Dade CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(11) Orlando Fire Department CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(12) Palm Beach County CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
(13) Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(14) RiverWalk CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(15) West Palm Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(16) Treasure Island CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(17) Polk County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(18) City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(19) City of Debary CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(20) South Daytona CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
Matrix for FL CCCs and CERTs 2002 
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FL CCCs and CERTs in 2005 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
(1) Statewide 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
(2) Bradford County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) Rockledge CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) Miramar CERT 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) Hallendale Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) Fort Lauderdale CERT 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(7) Dania Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(8) Coral Springs CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(9) Pompano Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(10) Citrus County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(11) Big Corkscrew Island Fire Rescue CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(12) Jax CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(13) Escambia County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(14) Flagler County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(15) Hernando County Nature Coast CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(16) Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(17) Gulfport CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(18) Sun City Center CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(19) Hillsborough County CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(20) Hillsborough County CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(21) Iona-McGregor Fire Protection/Rescue CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(22) Manatee County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(23) CERT of the Villages 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(24) North Miami Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(25) Miami Dade CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(26) Okaloosa County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(27) Orange County Florida CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(28) Orange County Florida CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(29) Orlando Fire Department CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(30) Palm Beach County CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(31) Palm Beach County CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(32) RiverWalk CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(33) Jupiter Police CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(34) Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(35) West Palm Beach CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(36) Pasco County CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(37) Treasure Island CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(38) East Lake CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(39) Pinellas Suncoast Fire Rescue CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(40) Polk County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(41) Navarre CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(42) Santa Rosa County CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(43) Sarasota COAD/CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(44) Sarasota County CERT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(45) Daytona Beach CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(46) City of Debary CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(47) City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(48) South Daytona CERT 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matrix for Florida CCCs and CERTs in 2005 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Network Centrality Measures for 2002, 2005, 2011 
 
109 
 
Florida CCCs and CERTs 2002 
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                                              ------------ ------------ ------------ 
    1                          Statewide CCC        18.000       94.737        0.429 
   12                  Palm Beach County CCC         3.000       15.789        0.071 
   13          Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT         2.000       10.526        0.048 
   14                         RiverWalk CERT         2.000       10.526        0.048 
   15                   West Palm Beach CERT         2.000       10.526        0.048 
    6                     Citrus County CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    7  Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    8                   Sun City Center CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    9                  North Fort Myers CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   10                        Miami Dade CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   11           Orlando Fire Department CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    2                         Rockledge CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    3                   Fort Lauderdale CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    4                     Pompano Beach CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    5                  Hallendale Beach CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   16                   Treasure Island CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   17                       Polk County CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   18        City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   19                    City of Debary CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
   20                     South Daytona CERT         1.000        5.263        0.024 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                            1            2            3 
                       Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                 ------------ ------------ ------------ 
    1      Mean         2.100       11.053        0.050 
    2   Std Dev         3.686       19.402        0.088 
    3       Sum        42.000      221.053        1.000 
    4  Variance        13.590      376.454        0.008 
    5       SSQ       360.000     9972.299        0.204 
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    6     MCSSQ       271.800     7529.085        0.154 
    7  Euc Norm        18.974       99.861        0.452 
    8   Minimum         1.000        5.263        0.024 
    9   Maximum        18.000       94.737        0.429 
   10  N of Obs        20.000       20.000       20.000 
 
 
Network Centralization = 92.98% 
Blau Heterogeneity = 20.41%.  Normalized (IQV) = 16.22% 
 
Copyright (c) 2002-11 Analytic Technologies 
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Florida CCCs and CERTs 2005 
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                                         
                                                                      Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                                                                ------------ ------------ ------------ 
    1                                                Statewide        29.000       61.702        0.274 
   30                  Palm Beach County Citizen Corps Council         5.000       10.638        0.047 
   31                                   Palm Beach County CERT         5.000       10.638        0.047 
    6                                     Fort Lauderdale CERT         4.000        8.511        0.038 
   20                Hillsborough County Citizen Corps Council         3.000        6.383        0.028 
   19                                 Hillsborough County CERT         3.000        6.383        0.028 
    5                                    Hallendale Beach CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
    8                                       Coral Springs CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   27                               Orange County Florida CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
    4                                             Miramar CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   35                                     West Palm Beach CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
    9                                       Pompano Beach CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   34                            Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   32                                           RiverWalk CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   45                                       Daytona Beach CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   28              Orange County Florida Citizen Corps Council         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   17                                            Gulfport CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   48                                       South Daytona CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
    7                                             Dania Beach          2.000        4.255        0.019 
   29                             Orlando Fire Department CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   33                                      Jupiter Police CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   18                                     Sun City Center CERT         2.000        4.255        0.019 
   22                                      Manatee County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
    2                                          Bradford County         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   13                                    Escambia County CERT          1.000        2.128        0.009 
   14                                      Flagler County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   15               Hernando County Nature Coast Citizen Corps         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   16                    Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   23                                     CERT of the Villages         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   12                                                 Jax CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   25                                          Miami Dade CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   26                                     Okaloosa County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
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    3                                           Rockledge CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   10                                       Citrus County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   11                    Big Corkscrew Island Fire Rescue CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   24                                   North Miami Beach CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   37                                     Treasure Island CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   38                                           East Lake CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   39                       Pinellas Suncoast Fire Rescue CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   40                                         Polk County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   41                                             Navarre CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   42                                   Santa Rosa County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   43                     Sarasota COAD/Citizens Corps Council         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   44                                     Sarasota County CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   21  Iona-McGregor Fire Protection & Rescue Service District         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   46                                      City of Debary CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   47                          City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT         1.000        2.128        0.009 
   36                       Pasco County Citizen Corps Council         0.000        0.000        0.000 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                            1            2            3 
                       Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                 ------------ ------------ ------------ 
    1      Mean         2.208        4.699        0.021 
    2   Std Dev         4.031        8.576        0.038 
    3       Sum       106.000      225.532        1.000 
    4  Variance        16.248       73.555        0.001 
    5       SSQ      1014.000     4590.313        0.090 
    6     MCSSQ       779.917     3530.633        0.069 
    7  Euc Norm        31.843       67.752        0.300 
    8   Minimum         0.000        0.000        0.000 
    9   Maximum        29.000       61.702        0.274 
   10  N of Obs        48.000       48.000       48.000 
 
 
Network Centralization = 59.48% 
Blau Heterogeneity = 9.02%.  Normalized (IQV) = 7.09% 
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Florida CCCs and CERTs 2011 
FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES: 
 
  
                   Degree                              
NrmDegree        Share 
 
------------ ------------ ------------ 
    1                                                           Statewide C C C         40.000       
36.036        0.134 
    6                                                             Broward  C C C        17.000       
15.315        0.057 
   14                                                       Fort Lauderdale CERT        16.000       
14.414        0.054 
   55                                                            Lee County CERT        10.000        
9.009        0.034 
   76                                                Metro Orlando Hispanic CERT         8.000        
7.207        0.027 
   82                                                     Palm Beach County CERT         5.000        
4.505        0.017 
   45                                                   Hillsborough County CERT         5.000        
4.505        0.017 
   97                                                            North Port CERT         5.000        
4.505        0.017 
   46                                                  Hillsborough County C C C         5.000        
4.505        0.017 
   83                                                    Palm Beach County C C C         5.000        
4.505        0.017 
   16                                                   Margate Fire Rescue CERT         4.000        
3.604        0.013 
   21                                                         Pompano Beach CERT         4.000        
3.604        0.013 
   89                                      Pinellas County Citizen Corps Council         4.000        
3.604        0.013 
   17                                                               Miramar CERT         4.000        
3.604        0.013 
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   68                                                    Miami Dade County C C C         4.000        
3.604        0.013 
    8                                                    Coconut Creek CERT Team         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   79                                                 Orange County Florida CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   95                                                     Santa Rosa County CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   15                                                      Hallendale Beach CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   38                                                      Escambia County CERT          3.000        
2.703        0.010 
  109                                                         Daytona Beach CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   78                                               Orlando Fire Department CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   96                                                    Santa Rosa County C C C         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   35                                                      Escambia County C C C         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   77                                                        Orange County C C C         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   36                                                    City of Pensacola C C C         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   94                                                               Navarre CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   34                                                     City of Pensacola CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
  110                                                         South Daytona CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   20                                                        Pembroke Pines CERT         3.000        
2.703        0.010 
   58                    Iona-McGregor Fire Protection & Rescue Service District         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
    4                                                   Brevard Fire Rescue CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
    9                                                           Cooper City CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
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   59                                                          Lehigh Acres CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   60                                                      North Fort Myers CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   44                                                              Gulfport CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
  107                                            City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   84                                                             RiverWalk CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   85                                                       West Palm Beach CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   19                                                          Oakland Park CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   24                                                               Weston CERT          2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   11                                                               Dania Beach          2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   43                                                Bloomingdale-Riverview CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   23                                                         Town of Davie CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   98                                                        Sarasota COAD/C C C         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   18                                                              Miramar C C C         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
    5                                                             Rockledge CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
  108                                                        Plantation Bay CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
    7                                               BSO Dania Beach CERT Program         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
  106                                                        City of Debary CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   47                                                       Sun City Center CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   10                                                         Coral Springs CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
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   81                                                        Jupiter Police CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   57                                                          Fort Myers Beach          2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   13                                                            City of Sunrise         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   56                                                            Cape Coral CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   63                                                  South Trail Fire & Rescue         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   61                                              San Carlos Park Fire District         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   80                                              Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
  111                                                         Walton County CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   64                                                                Levy County         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   62                                                               Sanibel CERT         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   22                                                                   Tamarac          2.000        
1.802        0.007 
  112                                                      Freeport Fire Rescue          2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   12                                                         City of Lauderhill         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   48                                                       Temple Terrace CERTY         2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   99                                                      Sarasota County CERT          2.000        
1.802        0.007 
   30                                                       Columbia County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   32                                                                   Jax CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
    2                                                        Alachua county CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   37                                                          Town Century CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
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   31                                                              Dixie County          1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   67                                                       CERT of the Villages         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   74                                                       Okaloosa County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   72                                                     North Miami Beach CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
    3                                                            Bradford County         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   49                                                   Indian County River CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   75                                                      Okaloosa County C C C         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   65                                                    Lakewood Ranch CERT Inc         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
  101                                            Sanford: Sanford P D Volunteers         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   25                                                         Citrus County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   26                                      Big Corkscrew Island Fire Rescue CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   69                                   'Canes Emergency Response Team (UM CERT)         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   70                                                            Miami Dade CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   29                                                North Naples Fire District          1.000        
0.901        0.003 
  100                                         Longwood Fire Department CERT Team         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   87                                                             East Lake CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   88                                                 Lealman Fire District CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   33                                                      Town of Century C C C         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   90                                         Pinellas Suncoast Fire Rescue CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
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   91                                                        Teasure Island CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   92                                                           Polk County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   93                                                          Polk County C C C         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   66                                                        Manatee County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   39                                                        Flagler County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   40                                                       Hamilton County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   41                                        Hernando County Nature Coast  C C C         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   42                                      Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   71                                            Miami Gardens Police Department         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   51                                                        Jackson County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   52                                                      Jefferson County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
  102                                                 Renaissance Charter School         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
  103                                                         Sumter County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
  104                                                               Sumter C C C         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
  105                                                        Suwanne County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   50                                                      Jackson County C C C         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   54                                                      Leesburg Florida CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   27                          Golden Gate Fire Control and Rescue District CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   53                                                      Lafayette County CERT         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
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   28                                                                  Immokalee         1.000        
0.901        0.003 
   86                                                         Pasco County C C C         0.000        
0.000        0.000 
   73                                             Key West Citizen Corps Council         0.000        
0.000        0.000 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
                            1            2            3 
                       Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                 ------------ ------------ ------------ 
    1      Mean         2.661        2.397        0.009 
    2   Std Dev         4.275        3.852        0.014 
    3       Sum       298.000      268.468        1.000 
    4  Variance        18.278       14.835        0.000 
    5       SSQ      2840.000     2305.008        0.032 
    6     MCSSQ      2047.107     1661.478        0.023 
    7  Euc Norm        53.292       48.010        0.179 
    8   Minimum         0.000        0.000        0.000 
    9   Maximum        40.000       36.036        0.134 
   10  N of Obs       112.000      112.000      112.000 
 
 
Network Centralization = 34.25% 
Blau Heterogeneity = 3.20%.  Normalized (IQV) = 2.33% 
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Freeman Betweeness Centrality Measures for 2002, 2005, 2011 
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FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Un-normalized centralization: 4767.000 
 
                                                         1            2 
                                               Betweenness nBetweenness 
                                              ------------ ------------ 
    1                          Statewide CCC       252.000       73.684 
   12                  Palm Beach County CCC         6.000        1.754 
   13          Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT         5.000        1.462 
   14                         RiverWalk CERT         5.000        1.462 
   15                   West Palm Beach CERT         5.000        1.462 
    6                     Citrus County CERT         0.000        0.000 
    7  Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT         0.000        0.000 
    8                   Sun City Center CERT         0.000        0.000 
    9                  North Fort Myers CERT         0.000        0.000 
   10                        Miami Dade CERT         0.000        0.000 
   11           Orlando Fire Department CERT         0.000        0.000 
    2                         Rockledge CERT         0.000        0.000 
    3                   Fort Lauderdale CERT         0.000        0.000 
    4                     Pompano Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
    5                  Hallendale Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
   16                    Teasure Island CERT         0.000        0.000 
   17                       Polk County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   18        City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        0.000 
   19                    City of Debary CERT         0.000        0.000 
   20                     South Daytona CERT         0.000        0.000 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                            1            2 
                  Betweenness nBetweenness 
                 ------------ ------------ 
    1      Mean        13.650        3.991 
    2   Std Dev        54.721       16.000 
    3       Sum       273.000       79.825 
    4  Variance      2994.427      256.013 
    5       SSQ     63615.000     5438.853 
    6     MCSSQ     59888.551     5120.255 
    7  Euc Norm       252.220       73.749 
    8   Minimum         0.000        0.000 
    9   Maximum       252.000       73.684 
   10  N of Obs        20.000       20.000 
 
Network Centralization Index = 73.36% 
 
FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Un-normalized centralization: 37535.000 
 
                                                                           1            2 
                                                                 Betweenness nBetweenness 
                                                                ------------ ------------ 
    1                                                Statewide       799.000       36.957 
   30                  Palm Beach County Citizen Corps Council         6.000        0.278 
   31                                   Palm Beach County CERT         6.000        0.278 
    6                                     Fort Lauderdale CERT         3.000        0.139 
   20                Hillsborough County Citizen Corps Council         1.000        0.046 
   19                                 Hillsborough County CERT         1.000        0.046 
   27                               Orange County Florida CERT         1.000        0.046 
    5                                    Hallendale Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
    2                                          Bradford County         0.000        0.000 
    4                                             Miramar CERT         0.000        0.000 
   11                    Big Corkscrew Island Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        0.000 
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    9                                       Pompano Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
   10                                       Citrus County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   14                                      Flagler County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   15               Hernando County Nature Coast Citizen Corps         0.000        0.000 
   16                    Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT         0.000        0.000 
   17                                            Gulfport CERT         0.000        0.000 
   12                                                 Jax CERT         0.000        0.000 
   13                                    Escambia County CERT          0.000        0.000 
    8                                       Coral Springs CERT         0.000        0.000 
   21  Iona-McGregor Fire Protection & Rescue Service District         0.000        0.000 
   22                                      Manatee County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   23                                     CERT of the Villages         0.000        0.000 
   24                                   North Miami Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
   25                                          Miami Dade CERT         0.000        0.000 
   26                                     Okaloosa County CERT         0.000        0.000 
    3                                           Rockledge CERT         0.000        0.000 
   28              Orange County Florida Citizen Corps Council         0.000        0.000 
   29                             Orlando Fire Department CERT         0.000        0.000 
   18                                     Sun City Center CERT         0.000        0.000 
    7                                             Dania Beach          0.000        0.000 
   32                                           RiverWalk CERT         0.000        0.000 
   33                                      Jupiter Police CERT         0.000        0.000 
   34                            Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        0.000 
   35                                     West Palm Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
   36                       Pasco County Citizen Corps Council         0.000        0.000 
   37                                     Treasure Island CERT         0.000        0.000 
   38                                           East Lake CERT         0.000        0.000 
   39                       Pinellas Suncoast Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        0.000 
   40                                         Polk County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   41                                             Navarre CERT         0.000        0.000 
   42                                   Santa Rosa County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   43                     Sarasota COAD/Citizens Corps Council         0.000        0.000 
   44                                     Sarasota County CERT         0.000        0.000 
   45                                       Daytona Beach CERT         0.000        0.000 
   46                                      City of Debary CERT         0.000        0.000 
   47                          City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        0.000 
   48                                       South Daytona CERT         0.000        0.000 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                            1            2 
                  Betweenness nBetweenness 
                 ------------ ------------ 
    1      Mean        17.021        0.787 
    2   Std Dev       114.070        5.276 
    3       Sum       817.000       37.789 
    4  Variance     13012.063       27.838 
    5       SSQ    638485.000     1365.964 
    6     MCSSQ    624579.000     1336.214 
    7  Euc Norm       799.053       36.959 
    8   Minimum         0.000        0.000 
    9   Maximum       799.000       36.957 
   10  N of Obs        48.000       48.000 
 
Network Centralization Index = 36.94% 
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FREEMAN BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Un-normalized centralization: 130898.500 
 
                                                                                             
                                                                                   Betweenness 
nBetweenness 
                                                                                  ------------ ---------
--- 
    1                                                           Statewide C C C       1194.500        
9.962 
    6                                                             Broward  C C C       171.500        
1.430 
   14                                                       Fort Lauderdale CERT        85.000        
0.709 
   75                                                Metro Orlando Hispanic CERT        62.000        
0.517 
   55                                                            Lee County CERT        28.500        
0.238 
   17                                                               Miramar CERT        19.000        
0.158 
  109                                                         South Daytona CERT        15.600        
0.130 
  106                                            City of Deland Fire Rescue CERT        15.600        
0.130 
  107                                                        Plantation Bay CERT        15.600        
0.130 
  105                                                        City of Debary CERT        15.600        
0.130 
  108                                                         Daytona Beach CERT        15.600        
0.130 
   88                                      Pinellas County Citizen Corps Council        12.000        
0.100 
   68                                                    Miami Dade County C C C        12.000        
0.100 
   82                                                    Palm Beach County C C C         8.500        
0.071 
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   96                                                            North Port CERT         6.000        
0.050 
   45                                                   Hillsborough County CERT         4.500        
0.038 
   46                                                  Hillsborough County C C C         4.500        
0.038 
   81                                                     Palm Beach County CERT         2.500        
0.021 
   95                                                    Santa Rosa County C C C         1.000        
0.008 
   16                                                   Margate Fire Rescue CERT         0.500        
0.004 
   20                                                        Pembroke Pines CERT         0.500        
0.004 
    8                                                    Coconut Creek CERT Team         0.500        
0.004 
    5                                                             Rockledge CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   11                                                               Dania Beach          0.000        
0.000 
   12                                                         City of Lauderhill         0.000        
0.000 
    4                                                   Brevard Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        
0.000 
    9                                                           Cooper City CERT         0.000        
0.000 
    3                                                            Bradford County         0.000        
0.000 
   10                                                         Coral Springs CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   30                                                       Columbia County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   31                                                              Dixie County          0.000        
0.000 
   32                                                                   Jax CERT         0.000        
0.000 
    7                                               BSO Dania Beach CERT Program         0.000        
0.000 
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   22                                                                   Tamarac          0.000        
0.000 
   29                                                North Naples Fire District          0.000        
0.000 
   36                                                    City of Pensacola C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   37                                                          Town Century CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   38                                                      Escambia County CERT          0.000        
0.000 
   39                                                        Flagler County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   34                                                     City of Pensacola CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   35                                                      Escambia County C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   42                                      Hernando County Sheriff's Office CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   43                                                Bloomingdale-Riverview CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   44                                                              Gulfport CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   18                                                              Miramar C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   19                                                          Oakland Park CERT         0.000        
0.000 
    2                                                        Alachua county CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   21                                                         Pompano Beach CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   49                                                   Indian County River CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   23                                                         Town of Davie CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   24                                                               Weston CERT          0.000        
0.000 
   25                                                         Citrus County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
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   47                                                       Sun City Center CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   15                                                      Hallendale Beach CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   28                                                                  Immokalee         0.000        
0.000 
   56                                                            Cape Coral CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   57                                                          Fort Myers Beach          0.000        
0.000 
   58                    Iona-McGregor Fire Protection & Rescue Service District         0.000        
0.000 
   59                                                          Lehigh Acres CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   60                                                      North Fort Myers CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   61                                              San Carlos Park Fire District         0.000        
0.000 
   62                                                               Sanibel CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   63                                                  South Trail Fire & Rescue         0.000        
0.000 
   64                                                                Levy County         0.000        
0.000 
   65                                                    Lakewood Ranch CERT Inc         0.000        
0.000 
   66                                                        Manatee County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   67                                                       CERT of the Villages         0.000        
0.000 
   13                                                            City of Sunrise         0.000        
0.000 
   69                                   'Canes Emergency Response Team (UM CERT)         0.000        
0.000 
   70                                                            Miami Dade CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   71                                            Miami Gardens Police Department         0.000        
0.000 
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   72                                                     North Miami Beach CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   73                                                       Okaloosa County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   74                                                      Okaloosa County C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   48                                                       Temple Terrace CERTY         0.000        
0.000 
   76                                                        Orange County C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   77                                               Orlando Fire Department CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   78                                                 Orange County Florida CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   79                                              Delray Beach Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   80                                                        Jupiter Police CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   26                                      Big Corkscrew Island Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   27                          Golden Gate Fire Control and Rescue District CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   83                                                             RiverWalk CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   84                                                       West Palm Beach CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   85                                                         Pasco County C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   86                                                             East Lake CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   87                                                 Lealman Fire District CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   33                                                      Town of Century C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   89                                         Pinellas Suncoast Fire Rescue CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   90                                                        Teasure Island CERT         0.000        
0.000 
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   91                                                           Polk County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   92                                                          Polk County C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   93                                                               Navarre CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   94                                                     Santa Rosa County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   40                                                       Hamilton County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   41                                        Hernando County Nature Coast  C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   97                                                        Sarasota COAD/C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   98                                                      Sarasota County CERT          0.000        
0.000 
   99                                         Longwood Fire Department CERT Team         0.000        
0.000 
  100                                            Sanford: Sanford P D Volunteers         0.000        
0.000 
  101                                                 Renaissance Charter School         0.000        
0.000 
  102                                                         Sumter County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
  103                                                               Sumter C C C         0.000        
0.000 
  104                                                        Suwanne County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   50                                                      Jackson  County C C C         0.000        
0.000 
   51                                                        Jackson County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   52                                                      Jefferson County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   53                                                      Lafayette County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
   54                                                      Leesburg Florida CERT         0.000        
0.000 
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  110                                                         Walton County CERT         0.000        
0.000 
  111                                                       Freeport Fire Rescue          0.000        
0.000 
73                                                Key West Citizen Corps Council         0.000        
0.000         
 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH MEASURE 
 
                            1            2 
                  Betweenness nBetweenness 
                 ------------ ------------ 
    1      Mean        15.234        0.127 
    2   Std Dev       114.072        0.951 
    3       Sum      1691.000       14.103 
    4  Variance     13012.479        0.905 
    5       SSQ   1470146.250      102.264 
    6     MCSSQ   1444385.250      100.472 
    7  Euc Norm      1212.496       10.113 
    8   Minimum         0.000        0.000 
    9   Maximum      1194.500        9.962 
   10  N of Obs       112.000      112.000 
 
Network Centralization Index = 9.92% 
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